Immigrant Settlement Agencies in Canada: A Critical Review of the Literature through the Lens of Resilience

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Key Findings and Recommendations: A Report Summary

This report offers a comprehensive critical literature review of the role of various institutional actors in the immigration and settlement process in Canada. The core concept of this report is resilience as it pertains to immigration in Canada, focusing particularly on cities in the major immigrant-receiving provinces of Ontario and Quebec. Resilience has been defined as “the capacity of individuals, communities and systems to survive in the face of stress and shocks, and even transform when conditions require” (Akbar 2017, ii). Successful settlement requires the individual resilience of newcomers in Canada and institutional resilience from the organizations, communities and government systems, which either aid in these processes or fail to do so. These actors are inextricably linked, they stand to benefit where Canadian institutions are strengthened, and made more responsive to the needs of immigrant and refugee communities.

In contributing to the Building Migrant Resilience in Cities project, this report has gathered, reviewed and analyzed a variety of academic, government and grey literature from the last two decades. In this time frame, it focusses not only on the diverse communities of immigrants and refugees in Canada but also on key stakeholders in their settlement including a range of non-profit organizations, foundations and coalitions, municipal, provincial and federal governments, universities and communities. It pays particular attention to the role of Immigrant Serving Agencies (ISAs) (Also see Praznik and Shields 2018a). This report critically examines these actors in the context of a neoliberal policy environment, which has shaped resettlement in Canada in recent decades. The objective of this report is to present and consider the major themes and dialogues in relevant literature, and in doing so to provide greater understanding of the immigration and settlement system in Canada and to offer a foundation for future research in this critical sphere.

This review covers a wide scope but among the many observations identified in this report five key findings are highlighted in this summary.

Some Key Findings:

1. Newcomer settlement in Canada is shaped uniquely by federal, provincial and municipal policy. Federal and provincial governments have long shared jurisdiction of such matters outside of Quebec, which is relatively more autonomous in terms of settlement policy. Canada’s other provinces and territories have gained an increasing stake in newcomer settlement through a variety of avenues including federal-provincial agreements and Provincial Nominee Programs. However, for the most part, literature suggests that policymaking power in immigration and settlement remains centralized within Canada’s federal government. At the local level, Canada’s cities has have become major immigrant hubs and are increasingly relied upon to foster resilience among newcomer residents. Unfortunately, constitutional,
operational and financial limitations restrict the capacity of municipal governments to foster resilience in resettlement among newcomer communities.

2. A diverse array of non-governmental stakeholders in settlement have developed key roles in fostering newcomer resilience, including the private sector, research and academic institutions and non-profit community organizations. In particular, literature suggests that non-profit community organizations can offer comprehensive, long-term and culturally and/or linguistically compatible settlement services to strengthen their client communities throughout the lengthy resettlement process. Due to their close connectedness to newcomer communities, these organizations are also key advocates for their clients changing needs where invited into multi-sectoral forums and in consultation with Canadian settlement policymakers.

3. Since the late 1980s, neoliberal public policy ascendant across North America has affected the capacity of newcomer-serving organizations to foster resilience among their client communities. In part, this has been caused varying degrees of government austerity in settlement budgeting. It has also been prompted by a shift to New Public Management governance, characterized in terms of federal determination of settlement policy and their regulation of non-profit service provision through competitive, fixed-term contracts and increased administrative reporting. Literature critical of these developments suggests that newcomer-serving organizations are weakened by financial dependence on government contracts and made less able to offer comprehensive, client-centred services and independent advocacy. Some suggest that this competitive environment also dampens capacity-building in the sector, problematizes collaboration within the settlement sector and worsens non-profit-government working relationships. In particular, smaller ethno-specific organizations with less collective resources are likely to be affected by New Public Management governance.

4. Immigration and settlement is by nature a global process, and literature suggests that certain trends examined in Canada are also emerging internationally. In many countries, governments engage non-profit organizations in partnerships to bolster newcomer resilience. These perspectives are valuable in exploring shared issues in terms of funding, autonomy and capacity. International perspectives also particularly important given recent increases in immigration and asylum-seeking in Western Europe, the rise of right-wing populism and anti-immigrant rhetoric emergent in the United States and around the world. As a member of the international community, Canadian settlement policy is influenced by this global context as well as the sharing of best practices between newcomer-receiving countries.

5. In the short-term, literature suggests that the Canadian government and non-profit organizations can strengthen newcomer communities by expanding eligibility for settlement programming, offering pre-arrival services and ensuring that programming is appropriately targeted as well as geographically, culturally and linguistically accessible. As home to the vast majority of immigrants and refugees in Canada, cities must also be specifically developed as sites of resilience for
newcomer residents. In the long-term, meeting the needs of Canada’s growing immigrant and refugee populations requires a large, diverse and comprehensively funded settlement sector. To this point, engrained structures of Canadian federalism and neoliberal public policy have limited the capacity of communities, non-profit organizations and municipalities to effectively engage with newcomers to Canada. Ultimately, literature suggests that newcomer resilience would directly result from more horizontal, reciprocal and mutually beneficial relationships between the upper-tiers of Canadian government responsible for coordinating and funding settlement services and the non-profit organizations tasked with their delivery.

If settlement in Canada is truly a “two-way street” where both government and non-government stakeholders help to facilitate social inclusion in fostering newcomer resilience (IRCC 2016), then state investments in settlement support and progressive migrant legislation and programing must continue. However, “just as immigrants face many systemic challenges during settlement and integration, so do service providers and policymakers” (Simich et al. 2005, 265). Where these critical support lines are weakened and made less resilient, vulnerability is passed directly into newcomer communities. This report has outlined the neoliberal context of settlement in Canada, mapping the vast landscapes, and hierarchies of government and non-government roles within this ecosystem. It has focussed on the way that these diverse actors shape immigration and settlement in Canada, particularly at the local level of communities, non-profit agencies, and municipalities. As part of the 
Building Migrant Resilience in Cities project, a multi-sectoral initiative among academics, government representatives, practitioners, policymakers, and newcomer communities, this report aims to contribute to this collaborative effort.
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1. Introduction and Objective

Immigrants and refugees who settle in Canada, add vibrancy to the mosaic of our society. In 2017, their immense economic, social and cultural contributions were recognized through Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s recently released 2018-2020 Immigration Levels Plan. This plan details the admission and settlement of almost one million newcomers over the next three years (IRCC 2017). Yet, for newcomers to Canada, settlement is not synonymous with their initial arrival. Rather, their first day in Canada marks the beginning of a much longer journey, which demands preparation, agency, skills and determination in rebuilding a new life in an unfamiliar land. In the context of migration and settlement, Akbar defines resilience as “the capacity of individuals, communities and systems to survive in the face of stress and shocks, and even transform when conditions require” (2017, ii). Successful settlement requires the individual resilience of newcomers in Canada and institutional resilience from the organizations, communities and government systems, which either aid in these processes or fail to do so. These actors are inextricably linked, they stand to benefit where Canadian institutions are strengthened, and made more responsive to the needs of immigrant and refugee communities.

Much discussion on immigrant resilience in recent years has centered on a neoliberal discourse that places the focus and responsibility on the individual’s adaptive capacity. Thus, immigrants with neoliberal value sets of a so-called ‘strong work ethic,’ high human capital skills, risk takers, and entrepreneurial are thought to be more resilient fostering independence (Hall and Lamont 2013; Root et al. 2014; Root et al. forthcoming; McBride and Mitrea 2017). This approach channels understandings of resilience along particular pathways, championing individualism, self-reliance, and minimizing the value of government support and their role in the settlement process.

Ignored in this understanding is the idea of social resilience a collective dimension and various social structures, most importantly from the state and civil society, are critical in producing support structures that enable resilience to be fostered by immigrant populations and for strong systems of interdependence to be created. Social structures like settlement and social supports, social inclusion policies, accessible citizenship pathways, sanctuary city policies, etc. help create spaces of inclusion and support that can foster social resilience and a voice for migrant communities, promoting more inclusive forms of integration. The ideas of social inclusion and a two-way street approach to settlement are important elements in understanding immigrant resilience in Canada.

Resilience, consequently, is both individually and collectively generated. Public and non-profit programs support immigrant adaptability and resilience in the settlement process, and in this sense providing care can be thought of as transferred resilience support (Deverteuil 2016, 31; Hall & Lamont 2013, 14). A dense network of agencies providing settlement services in some inner-city communities, such as found in Toronto and Montreal, also constitute ‘service hubs’, a non-profit common (Deverteuil 2016, 241-244) that rests beyond purely commercial space offering anchors of support and
solidarity and an important source of transferred resilience support for newcomer populations. Thus, these clusters of supporting non-profit agencies (ISAs) form important structures that enable social resilience.

This report is written in conjunction with the Building Migrant Resilience in Cities Project, a multi-sector five-year partnership among academics, community-based organizations and policymakers and led by Dr. Valerie Preston, York University. Funding was made possible by a Partnership Grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and support from research partners. The core concept of this report is resilience as it pertains to immigration in Canada, focusing particularly on cities in the major immigrant-receiving provinces of Ontario and Quebec. In contributing to the Building Migrant Resilience in Cities project, this report has gathered, reviewed and analyzed a variety of academic, government and grey literature from the last two decades. In this time frame, it focusses not only on the diverse communities of immigrants and refugees in Canada but also on key stakeholders in their settlement including a range of non-profit organizations, foundations and coalitions, municipal, provincial and federal governments, universities and communities. It pays particular attention to the role of Immigrant Serving Agencies (ISAs) (Also see Praznik and Shields 2018a). This report critically examines these actors in the context of a neoliberal policy environment, which has shaped resettlement in Canada in recent decades. The objective of this report is to present and consider the major themes and dialogues in relevant literature, and in doing so to provide a foundation for future research in this critical sphere.

2. What is integration in Canada?

a. Integration as “social inclusion”

Both individual and institutional resiliency in settlement and integration must be set within an overarching framework of what it means to successfully settle in Canada. Richmond and Omidvar note that in light of growing social divides, welfare crises, and the varied needs of increasingly diverse populations, “social exclusion” has become a common framework through which to view immigrants and refugees (2003, viii). Correspondingly, “social inclusion” has become increasingly popular as “both a process and a goal” in terms of newcomer settlement, although Richmond and Omidvar note that “social inclusion is not… just a response to inclusion” (2003, viii). Rather, social inclusion is “the realization of full and equal participation in the economic, social, cultural and political dimensions of life in their new country,” requiring “investments and action” to remove the barriers and risks in settlement which precipitate social exclusion. (Richmond and Omidvar 2003, 2). Similarly, for Lo et al., social inclusion is “concerned with the barriers or access people encounter in their attempts to gain a share of society’s resources” (2015, 2). Their work is focussed specifically on the intersections between social inclusion, public infrastructure and local settlement services, which remain “crucial” for reducing inequality in Ontario’s newcomer-rich York Region (2010, 3). Martin Papillion also examines cities and their diverse residents through a social
inclusion framework, considering the ways in which an urban environment can enable newcomers to contribute and participate in civic life (2002). While labour market access is a crucial determinant of social inclusion, Papillion reminds readers that cultural, social and political participation in community networks is also a vital element of “sustainable diversity” within and beyond Canada’s cities (2002, 1).

b. Integration as “a two-way street”

As Canada’s primary federal departments in matters of settlement and integration, Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) views newcomer social inclusion as a “two-way street” (IRCC 2017, 4). For IRCC, those recently arrived to Canada are “expected to take ownership” in their settlement process by the accessing the labour market, available supports and information about law and customs while establishing social connections within their communities (2017, 4). Meanwhile, the role of Canadian institutions is to “ensure there are inclusive laws/policies and enabling programs in place to promote inclusion for all permanent residents and citizens,” including an effective and comprehensive array of settlement services (IRCC 2017, 4). The national two-way street model is also echoed in the literature of settlement and integration. For example, Shields et al. argue that social inclusion is realized where every immigrant has “full freedom of choice regarding her/his level of participation in the society,” which involves shifts and adjustments both for newcomers and among the host society (2016, 5). Lowe et al. observe that while the “two-way street” is often discussed as a “dialectical process of integration,” in practice these accommodations “take place far more on the newcomer end than that of the host society” (2017, 16). Canada demands enormous resilience from the newcomers who settle here, as the responsibility for integration and inclusion is placed primarily on their shoulders.

c. Integration as a gradual, multi-layered and uneven process

Many scholars stress that the “two-way street” to settlement in Canada is in fact a long, winding road. According to Richmond and Shields, “it is essential to recognize that for newcomers to Canada, the settlement process is a lifelong journey,” often continuing into the second or third generation (2005, 515). They outline three general stages to in the continuum of settlement and integration. The first involves the immediate need of information, referrals, language, training, and short-term shelter. The middle stage of the process “involves securing access to appropriate employment and housing, education and so forth… for all members of the newcomers’ families” (Richmond and Shields 2005, 515). In the final stage of settlement, “newcomers develop some sense of attachment or belonging in Canada without giving up their ethno-racial identities or their ties to the homeland” (Richmond and Shields 2005, 515). Elsewhere, Valenzuela et al. describe these three stages as broad phases of adjustment, adaptation and integration (2018, 68).

In addressing “needs-based” models of integration and inclusion, George argues that different services meet newcomer social, economic, cultural and political needs at unique stages of their settlement (2002). Similarly, Sadiq cites Beyene (2000), who
identifies four levels of service provision linked to length of time in Canada: “1) reception level services, 2) basic level services, 3) labour market entry services and 4) specialized settlement services” (2004, 13). Reception and basic-level services involve referral, housing, job training, language training, interpretation and networking services. Labour market entry deals with credential evaluation, accreditation, labour market training, education and professional licencing. Finally, specialized services address individual needs in counselling on cultural barriers, family issues, occupational concerns, racism and the related stresses of settlement (Sadiq 2004, 12). Sadiq notes that “settlement needs vary among individual newcomers over time” and that this complex, layered process also involves the straddling of various stages simultaneously (2004, 13).

By examining social inclusion as a continuum, it becomes clear some phases are better supported by government funding, while others demand a greater extent of individual resilience from newcomers, as well as service providers on whom they rely. Richmond and Omidvar echo a consensus that “settlement funding and programming is focussed on the initial stages of adaptation, in spite of the fact that the process of settlement continues throughout the life of the newcomer” (2003, 7). Richmond and Shields argue that social exclusion is especially manifest in the latter stages of development, fostered in part by “an astounding lack of coordination” between upper-level stakeholders in provincial and federal tiers and local community actors (2005, 516). Similarly, Mwaringa notes the paradox that “federally-funded programs are weakest in dealing with the area of greatest need- the second stage of settlement-involving labour market integration and equitable access to general health, housing and social services” (2002, 20). Papillion finds that this short-term focus adds pressure on cities, non-profit agencies and newcomer communities, who primarily shoulder “the longer-term effects of the lack of crucial medium-term integration processes” (2002, 21).

3. Global discourse on the newcomer

In 2000, Shields and Evans argued that “rapidly advancing levels of economic polarization, marginalization and insecurity brought on by globalization, rapid technological change and severe state retrenchment” threatened diversity and social cohesion in modern nation-states (6). Today, Valenzuela et al. add the 9/11 attacks in New York City, the 2008 global financial crisis and Europe’s refugee humanitarian crisis as key influences in fostering a “stronger anti-immigrant paradigm” worldwide. Immigrant populations are made disproportionately socially, politically and economically vulnerable by these events and simultaneously blamed for their ill-effects. In this context, newcomers are often poised as a burden or threat to civil society, “feeding support for right-wing anti-immigration populism” and nationalist movements which have gained momentum and political power around the world (Valenzuela et al. 2018, 67).

For Richmond and Shields, Canada is unique in the group of Western industrialized democracies, as “public discourse continues to focus mainly on the benefits of immigration and the rights of newcomers, distinct from the security and terrorism dialogue dominating issues” elsewhere (2005, 514). In the United States and
Europe, for example, the national conversation is “increasingly polarized between pro and anti-immigrant positions,” and involves “a questioning of the benefits or indeed the legitimacy” of the multicultural ethos associated with immigration and settlement in Canada (Richmond and Shields 2005, 514). Valenzuela et al. similarly contrast the 2015 election of Justin Trudeau and the reversal of restrictive immigration laws introduced by the previous Conservative government with Donald Trump’s “anti-immigrant policy agenda” to the South (2018, 67).

Yet, while anti-immigration voices in Canada are perhaps less overt, our public discourse is by no means removed from this global context. Simich et al. suggest that that, in Canada too, “newcomers are often presented in public discourse as the source of social problems” (2005, 265). Many note that Quebec has experienced particularly turbulent intercultural relations. Germain and Trinh, for example, recall that Quebec’s 2007 “reasonable accommodation crisis,” initiated with regards to religious diversity concerns had an enormous effect on provincial immigration and equity policy (2011, 259). One of the emergent policies proposed that newcomers sign an application “agreeing to the common values of Quebec, the values being French as a common language, freedom and democracy, secularism of the state, pluralism the rule of law, gender equality and respect for the rights of others…” (Germain and Trinh 2011, 259). These issues are also apparent in national politics. The rhetoric of former prime minister Stephen Harper with regard to “bogus refugees” and “barbaric cultural practices” as well Conservative politician Kellie Leitch’s leadership campaign suggestion for screening of “Canadian values” are among the most prominent examples of these attitudes at the federal level. To better realize social inclusion and the well-documented benefits of immigration in Canada, Simich et al. conclude that “it is necessary to promote a positive shift in public discourse, from a tendency to categorize newcomers to Canada as needy service recipients to an emphasis on newcomers’ contributions, resilience and well-being” (265, 2005).

4. Neoliberal Policy Shift

Valenzuela et al. note that, both globally and in Canada, increasingly negative paradigms on newcomers and immigration “have been shaped by a world dominated by neoliberal ideas” (2018, 67). In the 1950s, inspired by postwar philosophies of British economist John Maynard Keynes, there was a general consensus across North America that widespread unemployment and economic stagnation required government intervention (Morris 1997). In terms of newcomer settlement and integration, Evans et al. refer to the “Keynesian” system as inspired by the idea of a comprehensive welfare state alongside which non-profit immigrant serving organizations (ISAs) operated as “significant junior partners” (2005, 77). As mutually supportive, interdependent institutions, the state and the non-profit sectors “grew in tandem, with a symbiotic and dynamic relationship developing between the two sectors” (Evans et al. 2005, 75). However, from the 1970s onwards, an aging workforce and increased global competition tightened the public purse strings as federal debt in Canada became “a terrifically serious concern” (Morris 1997, 26). At this time, Morris notes that neoliberal
doctrine based on cutting of public expenditure, deregulation, privatization and an emphasis on individual rather than state responsibility became “the basis for most governmental decision-making in Canada” (1997, 26). Shields argues that the neoliberal policy drift “shredded the Keynesian social contract,” reducing federal spending and the social and economic obligations of Canada’s federal government to its citizens (2004, 2). Arat-Koc finds that the neoliberal restructuring of the 1990s has shaped Canadian immigration and settlement policy, forging a system “emphasizing selection of immigrants to maximize their economic contribution to Canada, while minimizing any costs in their settlement and welfare” (1999, 49). Through a variety of instruments, this neoliberal policy shift has created a policy environment that erodes both newcomer resilience and that of the non-profit ISAs that serve them.

a. Neoliberalism, Funding Cuts and Austerity in Ontario and Quebec

Lowe et al. note that ISAs in Canada depend on government funding for over 85% of their budgets (2017, 25). In Ontario, the election of a Conservative provincial government under Mike Harris resulted in dramatic cutbacks for social services by and large, devastating provincial funding for settlement services. According to Sadiq, this era was characterized by “the reduction or total elimination of grants and other discretionary programs to NGOs, especially small ISAs with little political clout” (2004, 13). At this time, Acheson and Laforest note the disappearance of funding associated with the 1971 Multiculturalism Policy, “and with it, the main source of money for culturally-specific grassroots associations in immigrant communities” (2013, 605). Overall, Sadiq suggests that by 1996 “approximately 43 percent of all programs for immigrants and refugees were at a high risk of being eliminated” in Ontario (2004, 13). Among the ISAs that remained open, Richmond and Omidvar add that operations continued “under conditions of extreme stress, due to a combination of overloaded service demand and limited funding” (2003, 8).

In Ontario, there is a general consensus that the 2004 Canada-Ontario Immigration agreement eased the challenges of austerity in the 1990s by providing ISAs with a “sharp expansion of federal settlement funding” (Shields et al. 2014, 19). Under COIA, Ontario received an additional $920 million in federal funding over five years, increasing per capita spending by over $1600 (Biles et al. 2011, 205). However, Biles et al. find that “the lion’s share of these funds were absorbed by immigrant service provider organizations that have been dominant players in the field for decades,” as small, ethno-specific organizations continued to struggle for funding (2011, 237). Across the sector, Lowe et al. 2017 study suggests that COIA “was like building the sector out of a ‘house of cards’” in that there was little funding or planning to withstand a withdrawal of these funds later on” (2017, 26). COIA expired in 2010, and was granted a one year extension before its eventual cancellation. Once again the settlement sector faced funding cuts, and according to Lowe et al. many non-profit professionals now feel it will “never fully recover from post-COIA claw-backs” (2017, 26). According to Kilbride, in Ontario “the marked deterioration of funding in the Harris government years has not yet fully remedied, much less have new issues been adequately funded (2009, iii). While a new iteration of COIA was signed in 2017, the agreement has not yet specified
the transfer of any additional intergovernmental funding. In 2017, COIA was a commitment to intergovernmental information sharing and coordination around immigrant settlement and integration rather than devolution.

In contrast to other Canadian provinces, Quebec operates under a uniquely autonomous system of settlement service provision. The 1991 Canada-Quebec Accord awards the province a separate stream of federal funding and exclusive control over newcomer reception and integration (Germain and Trinh 2011). In 2017, this agreement afforded over $345 million to Ministère de l'immigration et des communautés culturelles (MICC) for immigration and settlement. Nonetheless, similarities in federal and provincial austerity and funding cuts have also been noted in Quebec. Germain and Trinh, for example, argue that “funder budgets seem to have evolved at a very different speed than immigration levels” (2011, 270). Echoing the sentiment among ISAs in the rest of Canada, Germain and Trinh note discomfort amongst Quebecois ISAs in terms of “the gap between increasing clientele and slow-growing budgets” (Germain and Trinh 2011, 270).

b. Neoliberalism and settlement service devolution

In the realm of social services, Evans et al. summarize that cost-cutting neoliberal policy was framed by the reasoning that “government should steer (focus on policy setting and coordination) and leave the rowing (the delivery of publicly supported services) as much as possible to other parties” (2005, 77). This mode of alternative service delivery was achieved through devolution, defined by Arat-Koc as “a process whereby the federal government is divesting itself of deficits and downloading social programmes and fiscal responsibilities to the provincial level” and other levels of government and society (1999, 48). In the settlement sector, devolution was enacted through the 1995 Settlement Renewal policy in which the federal government offloaded responsibility to the provinces via federal-provincial settlement agreements. Devolution has also been visible in Provincial Nominee Programs signed in 1998 by British Columbia and Saskatchewan followed by New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador in 1999, Alberta and Prince Edward Island in 2002 and lastly in Ontario in 2007. For its part, Quebec had already signed a more comprehensive devolution agreement through the 1991 Canada-Quebec Accord (Bauder and Flynn 2015, 543). For Bauder and Flynn, the enabling of provinces to nominate newcomers through the Provincial Nominee Programs is a “prime example” of neoliberal public policy, as heightened provincial responsibility in immigrant selection “ultimately cuts costs for the federal government” (2015, 542). This was part of the broader process of provincialization of immigration that began in the 1990s.

Some scholars argue that devolution to the provincial level can actually enable solutions to local challenges in settlement. For example, McGrath and McGrath praise the former Canada-British Columbia Immigration Agreement as “a model of devolution,” in which federal funders transferred payments to the province who, in turn, focussed on the design, delivery, administration and evaluation of settlement and integration of province-specific programming (2013, 6). However, Siemiatycki and Triadafilopoulos
remind us that “sub-national government involvement in immigration must be matched with federal funds, and… devolution should never be an end in and of itself, but a means of strengthening immigrant settlement and integration” (2010, 6). As devolution in Ontario in the 1990s was largely unfunded, Mwaringa characterizes Ontario’s settlement sector as one which was placed in “limbo” and one in which there is a lack of coordination between municipal, provincial and federal stakeholders (2002, 100). A broad consensus of scholars conclude that this situation is not neutrally balanced, that the burden falls largely on the community level, including municipalities, ISAs and local communities (Acheson and Laforest 2013; Baines et al. 2014; Shields and Evans 2000). “As the state recedes it does not wither away,” write Shields and Evans, “but rather a shadow state emerges to fill its void” until the nation-state “is no longer readily or easily identified as the source of the problem” (2000, 18). As upper-tier governments claim less responsibility in settlement, Sadiq finds that “the settlement system has evolved into a para-state or parallel system,” in delivering services that had formerly been supplied by public run agencies (2004, 2).

c. Neoliberalism and New Public Management

A wealth of available literature examines the ways in which Canada’s neoliberal policy shift not only altered responsibilities in funding and settlement service, but has fundamentally restructured the “state-societal relationship” (Shields and Evans 2000, 2). Experts conclude that though the non-profit third sector in settlement has been “assigned a key role as an agent of the state” in terms of settlement service delivery (Richmond and Shields 2005, 518), the federal government has remained “at the centre and apex” of policy-making (Shields and Evans 2000, 16). This is the basis of New Public Management (NPM) governance, which relies on competitive, contract-based funding to “bring the rigours of a business or private-sector approach to perceived service inefficiencies among non-profit organizations” (Richmond and Shields 2005, 518). As Lowe et al. note, “New Public Management has served as a transmission belt to impose neoliberal governance and practice models into the non-profit service sector” (2017, 19).

Following World War II, Baines et al. recount that the “Keynesian” system was characterized by “core-funding” in which ISAs were given yearly governmental transfers and “considerable latitude in terms of how government dollars could be spent (Baines et al. 2014, 79). Under NPM, short-term contracts “very narrowly prescribe how funding can be spent,” and cover only direct program costs rather than holistic organizational and operational budgets. While the government and ISAs are supposedly brought into partnership through this contract-based model, many argue that this structure favours the funder agenda rather than fostering resilience in the sector and for its clients. For example, Sadiq finds that within the contract-based funding regime, “the government… exercises a fair amount of social control over NGOs, because contract requirements and regulatory provisions specify which services will be funded” (2004, 4). Similarly, Evans et al. argue that “state contracting/outsourcing may be viewed as extending state control” in non-profit ISAs, as “the result is centralized decentralization; the state is able to control outcomes through market-based contracts and managerialist outcomes
structures” at a distance. (2014, 88).

In particular, Baines et al. question the “unidirectional, top-down reporting mechanisms” through which the government mediates service-provision contracts (2014, 79). Across available literature, “increasingly onerous and arbitrary accountability requirements” are noted to consume time and resources in overburdened ISAs (Richmond and Shields 2005, 517). For example, in studying the effect of neoliberalism on the third sector in contrast to the “Keynesian era,” Baines et al. find it “not uncommon for accounting and reporting activities to absorb twenty percent of the work time of service deliverers” (2014, 85). They suggest that administrative procedures lessen time and resources for direct service provision, increase staff work burden and reduce organizational autonomy to customize services according to client needs (Baines et al. 2014, 85). Richmond and Shields note that while monitoring of spending and programming should be a clear priority for community stakeholders in settlement, “the continual multiplication of the volume and complexity of administrative systems does not provide program evaluation,” which “by its nature requires a macro perspective and commitment of expertise beyond the mandate of a single program or agency” (2005, 519). For Evans et al., the government would better account for spending through “adequate financial support, infrastructure and long-term vision” rather than insisting upon the “narrow administrative forms of accountability” which become the status quo under NPM governance (2005, 87).

5. **Social exclusion and labour market integration**

In recent years, scholars have linked the social exclusion of immigrants and refugees to challenges in full and fruitful participation in Canada’s labour market. Richmond and Omidvar cite a host of studies indicating that, since the 1980s, “immigrants to Canada… have not fared as well as previous cohorts of immigrants in terms of earnings and employment outcomes, in spite of the fact that these recent immigrants are more highly-educated and skilled than previous cohorts” (2003, 2; also see Shields et al. 2011). They link a higher incidence of poverty with greater need for social and settlement services to foster resilience among newcomers in Canada. This is particularly the case for recent immigrants to Canada who have been in the country for less than ten years. In 2002, Papillion noted that while some immigrants eventually attain income on par with the Canadian average, the data suggests “sharp differences” and significantly higher poverty rates for recent immigrants in the initial stages of settlement (9). Still, recent studies point to troubling economic outcomes for newcomers, decades after their first arrival. In 2017, examining chronic low income as persistent for over five years, Picot and Lu find that “the chronic low-income rate was 2.6 times higher among immigrants than the Canadian-born in 2000, and 3.3 times higher in 2012” (2017, 6). Chronic low income was “found not to be restricted to more recently arrived migrants,” as by 2012 “there was little difference in the low-income rates between immigrants who had been in Canada for 5 to 10 years and those in the country for 16 to 20 years” (Picot and Lu 2017, 6).
Richmond and Shields contrast Canada’s “official inclusion policies” and our national multicultural ethos with “the growing social exclusion of Canada’s newcomers in Canada’s economic sphere and public life more generally” (2005, 515). Among others, they note that these low-income patterns point to “the concentration of economic disadvantage and social exclusion in particular urban neighborhoods with high concentrations of recent newcomers and visible minorities” (2005, 515). Galabuzi terms this phenomenon “the racialization of poverty,” suggesting that these inequalities extend beyond the economic realm and serve as “social determinants of health and well-being, with higher health risks, barriers to social services, and increased contact with the criminal justice system” (2001, 7). In short, economic and labour market indices bleed into a broader, self-reinforcing social exclusion. As newcomers become further removed from the interlinked spheres of labour market integration, health and well-being and social, cultural and political engagement, their vulnerability to further exclusion increases while resilience to each new challenge is sapped.

Shields et al. note that trends in newcomer labour market exclusion are “replete with nuances related to sex, age, race/ethnicity, source country, language, place of residence, jurisdiction, education and immigration class” (2014, 7). As aforementioned, relatively poorer outcomes are found among more recent immigrants as well as those who are older, racialized and urbanized, for those with a non-native mother tongue, those who primarily speak a non-official language and those who enter Canada in the refugee and family class cohorts (Shields et al. 2014, 8). However, it is abundantly clear that exclusion from Canada’s labour market is harmful not only for Canada’s newcomers, but for the country’s economy itself. In 2003, Richmond and Omidvar suggest that underutilization of immigrant skills within the Canadian labour market coupled with pay inequity led to an earnings deficit of over $15 billion dollars (4). Authors offer a myriad of interlinked factors in newcomer labour market exclusion. Stasiulus suggests that “the development of effective economic integration policies for skilled immigrants is notably hampered by rigidity in the recruitment and credentialing process” which involves many stakeholders including provincial bodies, professional associations, other regulatory bodies and employers (2011, 77). Shields et al. find that, while returns to foreign experience “may have recovered moderately in the early 2000s,” declining returns to foreign education are a major barrier for newcomers looking to integrate into Canada’s labour market (2014, 9). Many contextualize credential non-recognition within broader forms of racism and discrimination in Canadian hiring and employment practices, including the demands for “Canadian experience” (Shields 2004, Shields et al. 2014, Stasiulus et al. 2011). While the Canadian government recognizes these barriers to some extent, Stasiulus et al. argue that current addresses “are hindered by their neoliberal premises, which focus almost exclusively on the individual actions of immigrants and employers rather than on mechanisms producing the systemic inequalities” (2011, 78).

Newcomer labour market exclusion increases ISA workload, not only in terms of employment, but across all facets of settlement and social services. Since 1976, Canada has actively employed its pioneering Points System to select immigrants already highly resilient to the challenges of settlement, who bring with them key
resources in terms of education, work experience, being in the prime working age cohort, and financial assets. For many analysts, increasing admission of these economic class immigrants relative to other immigrant classes reflects a neoliberal shift in Canadian immigration policy, as newcomers are expected to rely more on their own resources and individual sources of resilience in settlement and labour market integration (Arat-Koc 1999; George 2002; Stasiulus et al. 2011). Arat-Koc suggests that, among Canada’s policymakers, “it was thought that...these are the qualities of a desirable labour force,” though in reality even those admitted through the Points System “may not necessarily be privileged in terms of opportunities once in Canada” (1999, 43). In municipalities across Ontario, Stasiulus et al. found settlement agencies “contending with the unanticipated increase in workloads created by an unexpected type of client – namely, the skilled or professional immigrant who faces difficulty in finding a job commiserate with his or her qualifications” (2011, 106).

The increasing dominance of precarious employment in all job categories for newer entrants to the labour market is making meaningful labour market integration more difficult even for the highly qualified (Procyk et al. 2017). For ISAs operating in a neoliberal policy environment, Richmond and Shields note the paradox that “at the same time as greater expectations are being placed on non-profit organizations to fill the gaps in services left by a retreating welfare state, demand for many of those services has rapidly increased brought on by problems fostered by a dramatically restructured social and economic environment” (2004, 7). Though non-profits remain essential in fostering newcomer resilience to labour market challenges, “the question of capacity of the non-profit sector to cope with such increased demand is raised” (Richmond and Shields 2004, 7).

6. Federal Role in Integration and Settlement

As aforementioned, much of the available literature documents the restructuring of the federal role in Canadian integration and settlement, both in terms of restricted funding and the devolution of service provision responsibilities. However, particularly in light of the recentralization of federal-provincial agreements in Manitoba and British Columbia in 2012, some suggest that there has not been a significant redistribution of power between federal and provincial governments in Canadian settlement governance outside of Quebec (Papillion 2002; Stasiulus et al. 2011; Hiebert 2016). IRCC remains the major policymaker and funder, making key decisions about service provision and funding contracts in consultation with other branches of Canada’s federal government. Federal funding is provided by IRCC to ISAs on the frontlines of newcomer service provision via competitive, short-term contracts, although contract length has been extended more recently (Neudorf 2016). Many scholars are critical of the distribution of policymaking power in Canadian settlement. In Ontario’s urban areas, Stasiulus et al. link an absence of any “major shift in decentralization or power-sharing” to underutilizing local community knowledge and networks (2011, 131). Similarly, Papillion notes that settlement governance remains “largely a top-down process,” and that “while knowledge about needs (which vary considerably) lies mostly at the community level, programming
is for the most part developed vertically” (2002, 20). Other non-state actors, however, have been empowered in the immigrant selection process, particularly employers, universities and colleges, which does constitute a devolution of authority.

a. Federally-funded settlement services in Canada

As the primary federal agency responsible for settlement initiatives, IRCC supports immigrants and refugees through a complex web of programs and funding. The Resettlement Assistance Program (RAP) is the only stream exclusive to government-assisted refugees (GARs) who are provided federal funding equivalent to social assistance rates for up to one year. According to Nakhaie, this funding is meant to “bridge GARs into Canadian society, help them pay for transportation loans… learn English or French and segue into the labour market” (2018, 13). However, he also notes that in the context of Canada’s high living cost, lack of language skills, financial resources, and other barriers of the refugee resettlement experience forces them to rely on other settlement services and forms of welfare (Nakhaie 2018, 13). IRCC settlement programs targeted immigrants formerly part of the Language Instruction for Newcomers in Canada (LINC) program, which provided basic language training in English or French, and the Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Program (IASP), which focussed on reception, referral, orientation, interpretation, and translation for newcomers to Canada. The Host Program provided additional funding for organizations to train volunteers in helping newcomers adapt to life in Canada (Lim et al. 2005, 6).

Neudorf notes that in 2008, IRCC implemented a Modernized Approach to settlement and integration by consolidating these three funding streams into a single Settlement Program, which introduced multi-year funding contracts (2016). In doing so, IRCC “envisioned an accountability regime that combined the measurement of outputs, outcomes and financial resources to ensure that the activities of organizations were achieving results efficiently” (Neudorf 2016, 93). Among key informants from the non-profit sector, Neudorf found that though multi-year contracts “reduced time spent haggling over funding,” many ISA representatives expressed the need for further flexibility in funding contracts and accountability requirements (2016, 98). More broadly, Richmond and Shields find that IRCC funding focusses particularly on the first stages of settlement, including “information and referral, language training, short-term shelter etc.” (2005, 515). According to Papillion, these federally-funded services funded by the government “do not include essential long-term settlement services such as community development initiatives, access to programs for housing, health and other social services or market-oriented skills development programs” (2002, 17). These services are critical for newcomers to develop resilience in Canada in latter stages of settlement, and their absence may contribute to noted patterns in social exclusion among immigrants and refugees in Canada.

a. Settlement Service Eligibility

Among informants from Canada’s non-profit settlement sector, exigent eligibility requirements in federal funding are a commonly cited challenge for immigrants and
refugees in Canada and for the ISAs that serve them (Shields et al. 2014; Tilson 2010; Mwaringa 2002). As federal funding is the primary source of income for frontline ISAs, Ashton et al. note that IRCC settlement funding “can only be provided to permanent residents of Canada” and that temporary foreign workers, international students, and Canadian citizens are not eligible for IRCC-funded programs (2016, 75). While government-assisted refugees (GARs) and privately-sponsored refugees (PSRs) are eligible for federally-funded settlement services upon arrival, refugee claimants are also ineligible until they attain permanent residency. IRCC’s policy position is driven by Canada’s Treasury Board rules, “based upon the premise that Canada has no commitment to supporting migrants until they become permanent residents…and that the Canadian taxpayer would not support providing extensive settlement services to those who may only stay in Canada a limited time” (Ashton et al. 2016, 75). In the past, British Columbia and Manitoba exercised leeway in this policy in former Settlement Agreements with IRCC and the provincial governments of Alberta and Saskatchewan also “provided some funding for separate services to non-residents” (Ashton et al. 2016, 76). Yet, for ISAs in Canada, eligibility remains an “ongoing issue” (Ashton et al. 2016, 75), that threatens to “seriously cripple” their capacity to serve newcomer clients (Mwaringa 2002, 19).

In Ashton et al.’s 2016 study, many key informants from Canada’s non-profit settlement sector likened eligibility requirements to “segregation between immigrants who could access IRCC funded services and the ‘others,’” and described them as “an affront to their fundamental principles and values” in service provision (76). This phenomenon has been widely observed. In a study of Peel-region ISAs, Mukhtar et al. recount multiple instances of agencies forced to turn clients away due to ineligibility, and one Caledon ISA reported that 80% of callers inquiring after federally-funded English classes were ineligible (2015, 399). As Papillion notes, ISA service-providers are “faced with a difficult dilemma between refusing such clients, despite their obvious need, or providing services without receiving the financial resources to do so” (2002, 17). Highly dependent on federal funding, ISAs are forced to choose between their own institutional resilience, and their mission to foster resilience unconditionally among newcomer clientele.

7. The Provincial Role in Integration and Settlement: Ontario and Quebec

a. Ontario, “The Sleeping Giant”

Biles et al. refer to Ontario, as the “sleeping giant” in that, although the province is the primary newcomer destination nationwide, it long remained relatively uninvolved in matters of settlement and immigration. However, alongside the establishment of Canada’s Points System in the late 1960s came “a wakeup call,” as Ontario became increasingly diverse and driven by immigration (Biles et al. 2011, 198). At this time, government ministries became involved in settlement and integration programing, and “for the first-time governments, not religious, charitable or community organizations – were the single largest funders of agencies providing services to newcomers” (Biles et
While this active role was maintained by the NDP government until 1995, Mike Harris’ Conservative provincial government “rapidly set about scaling back many of the inclusion initiatives introduced by the NDP,” including equity legislation and settlement service funding (Biles et al. 2011, 203). When the Liberals came to power in 2003, they did not immediately reinstate provincial funding in the settlement, although they did enhance infrastructure by creating the Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration (MCI).

With the implementation of COIA in 2005, Ontario finally became an “active player” in settlement and integration (Biles et al. 2011, 205). In 2007, Ontario finalized its Provincial Nominee Program, creating its own immigration stream in accordance with provincial labour demands (Bauder and Flynn 2015, 542). The province now funds settlement services through MCI’s Newcomer Settlement Program, to which ISAs apply for direct project and sectoral support funding. Direct settlement services include information, referrals, orientation, general settlement assistance, job counselling, training, and sectoral support projects include the training and development of settlement workers as well as sectoral development strategies (Lim et al. 2005, 8). Alongside MCI, the Ministry of Community Health and Social Services, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities are also major funders of settlement services in Ontario (See Praznik and Shields 2018c). However, Biles et al. note that particularly since the expiry of COIA 2005, Ontario’s provincial involvement in settlement has been “modest” in comparison to the federal tier (2011, 211). In the fiscal year of 2017-18, it is estimated that IRCC will provide a little over $334 million in funding for settlement services in Ontario. For its part, the province will provide about $110 million in settlement supports (MCI 2017), about one-third of the federal total.

In June 2018, the province elected a majority Progressive Conservative government committed to ‘fiscal responsibility’ agenda and the promise to find public sector ‘efficiencies’ to shrink the size of the public sector. It is unclear at this point what this means for the province’s financial support of settlement services. While shrinking the size of the Cabinet, the Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration was eliminated as a standalone department. An indication, perhaps of the reduced priority the new government places on the immigration and settlement portfolio. The Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities has been given the responsibility for immigration training programs (Bridge Training), as well as the Office of the Fairness Commissioner. The Ministry of Children, Community and Social Services manages citizenship and immigration policy, including newcomer and refugee settlement, and the Ministry of Economic Development, Job Creation and Trade overlooks the Ontario Immigrant Nominee Program. Coordination between the programs will be more challenging under this division of responsibilities.

b. Quebec Exceptionalism

A product of Canada’s complex colonial history and system of federal governance, the literature acknowledges Quebec’s exceptionalism in the realm of
settlement and integration. Bauder and Flynn note that “at the provincial level, Quebec has long played a key role in immigrant settlement” since establishing its own Department of Immigration in 1968 (2015, 545). In 1991, Canada and Quebec signed the Canada-Quebec Accord mandating shared jurisdiction over immigration, with Quebec having “exclusive control over reception and integration” (Germain and Trinh 2011, 257). Beyond Quebec, recent developments toward greater provincial autonomy in settlement and integration halted in 2012 as Harper’s federal government recentralized federal settlement provision, and as Hiebert notes “at this point, only Quebec retains both the selection and integration provisions granted to it in 1991” (2016, 14). While Quebec’s system of immigrant selection is similar to the Provincial Nominee Programs (PNP) in other provinces, Bauder and Flynn note that “the Canada-Quebec Accord …includes not only economic immigration but also family reunification and refugees” (2015, 543). In the 2017/2018 fiscal year, IRCC transferred $378.213 million directly to the government of Quebec (IRCC 2017), which the province uses to help manage settlement, integration and French language training via services including reception and referral, counselling, housing and settlement, labour market integration, language lessons and temporary financial assistance (Germain and Trinh 2011, 258). In 2013, this amounted to funding of $4368 per newcomer, the highest level of support by a wide margin in Canada (McGrath and McGrath 2013, 5). This is primarily directed to the Ministère de l’immigration et des communautés culturelles (MICC), which operates the Reception Program for Newcomers, the Regional Integration Program, the Civic and Intercultural Relations Program and the Linguistic integration program for immigrants (Germain and Trinh 2011, 260). MICC also partners with other provincial partners including the Ministries of Education and Sport, Health and Social Services, Employment and Economic Development.

Due to the autonomous nature of the Quebec system, McGrath and McGrath note that provincial expenditure in the realm of settlement is somewhat “unclear” (2013, 5). However, analysis of Quebec’s settlement governance suggests in terms of settlement policymaking. While Reichhold notes that Quebec is in the “enviable position” of holding exclusive powers over immigrant selection and integration, he is also critical of the province’s “one-size-fits-all” approach to settlement services, which cannot be easily tailored to local needs (2010, 39). McGrath and McGrath similarly find that the province has been inflexible dealing with municipalities and ISAs, and suggest that this structure has led to a lack of coordination among Quebec’s diverse cities and regions (2013).

8. The Centrality of Non-Profit ISAs in Canadian Integration and Settlement

Canada’s third sector contributes significantly to the value of services offered in health, education, social and human services. It is a prominent factor of life’s social and cultural dimensions in Canada. Sadiq, observing a “parallel system comprised of NGOs that deliver services formerly provided by the state,” utilizes Wolch’s (1990) concept of the “shadow state” to describe role of non-profit ISAs at the frontlines of Canadian settlement. In terms of settlement and integration, there are several distinct types of
non-profits corresponding to different models of service provision. Sadiq broadly divides ISAs as mainstream, multicultural, or ethno-specific (2004, 12). Mainstream organizations assist the general population, working to enhance overall cultural capacity. For example, public service foundations, multicultural non-profits, large social service entities like the YMCA and faith-based organizations address issues related to immigration and settlement as part of their broad mission-based mandate. These organizations conduct outreach in ethnic communities, but are often unable to offer linguistic and culture specific services for their heterogeneous clientele (Sadiq 2004, 12). Multicultural agencies work specifically with newcomers, serving a range of ethnic communities. Sadiq notes that multi-service agencies often universalize client needs, but in reality “the needs within any one ethnic group may be extremely diverse” (2004, 12). Ethno-specific target services to a particular ethnic group, and offer linguistic and cultural competency, but are often “under-funded, staffed by non-professional volunteers, and unable to provide specialized services” (Sadiq 2004, 12). Finally, all ISAs join together under umbrella organizations, to serve their collective interest. For example, the Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants (OCASI) advocates for over 225 ISAs, coordinating initiatives within the sector and serving as a forum for sectoral advocacy (Biles et al. 2011, 230, OCASI http://ocasi.org/service-information-system-ocasi-member-agencies). For Shields et al., “part of the value of the non-profit service sector is the plurality of organizational and service forms they come in,” suggesting that the variety of ISAs helps them to meet the unique needs of Canada’s diverse newcomer population (2014, 23).

For Shields and Evans, “non-profits often fill special needs that private businesses fail to satisfy and government programs have not covered,” incorporating distinct values into their mandates including “philanthropy, altruism, charity, reciprocity, mutuality” (2000, 3). They identify four major roles for the third sector: 1) to “do the good works” of providing services in the community, 2) as drivers of advocacy for public education and policy change, 3) as mediators, bringing together diverse stakeholders to foster social capital and social cohesion and 4) as builders of citizenship, promoting “participation and membership in a community” (2000, 6). Elsewhere, Richmond and Shields underscore “the necessity of autonomy” from the government and private sector in fulfilling this mission (2005, 20). In a broader sense, available literature ties community organizations to citizenship and belonging in Canada not only among newcomers but in the Canadian-born population as well. In the 1970s and 1980s, prior to robust neoliberal restructuring, Acheson and Laforest argue that “community groups were regarded as spaces where citizens could attain and practice skills of citizenship” by representing a particular social, ethnic or cultural group and articulating their needs (2013, 603). Valenzuela et al. find that this dynamic has not changed, in that “NGOs as core partners in settlement services have a significant role to play in social justice” as well (2018, 12).

In a study by Simich et al., it was noted that newcomers “demonstrate remarkable resilience and willingness to retrain, to share information and support with other newcomers, to work collaboratively to identify common needs and to create programs to fill service gaps,” providing their own communities with crucial, informal settlement support (2005, 263). However, they also suggest that these resilient communities can
be further strengthened through the formal services offered by ISAs, which beyond direct services foster “a sense of empowerment, community and social integration, building networks, sharing experiences, and problems, reducing stress and contributing to physical and mental health” (2005, 259). As ISAs became the mainstay frontline service providers for newcomers in Canada, Richmond and Shields find that they have “accumulated a wealth of experience and expertise to contribute to improved settlement outcomes,” influencing the development of newcomer resilience in unique and valuable ways (2005, 516). Stasiulus et al. argue that “the extensive networks of civil society actors that form the shadow state in Ontario’s settlement sector... are more attuned than upper-level governments to the complexity of local conditions that assist or impede the economic, social and political incorporation of immigrants” (2011, 132). In Quebec as well, Reichhold finds that the unique capacity of community-based organizations to foster resilience among newcomer clients stems from an intimate understanding of “the migratory process, the identity shocks it can trigger, the different immigration statuses and the complexity of the situations that community workers must face” (2010, 40).

Across Canada, many suggest that ISAs upend top-down policymaking by asserting this unique community knowledge into service provision and practices, and in understanding how government policies impact immigrant communities on the ground (Evans and Shields 2014). Trudeau and Veronis argue that, as “active participants in the process of state restructuring that articulate state policies into local experience,” ISAs “constitute important sites in which state policies take shape” and are performed or resisted (2009, 1118). Shan similarly underscores the importance of community knowledge in government policy, suggesting that “organizations of settlement workers need not only serve the profession but enter formally into the field as policy actors” (2015, 22). Many agree with Valenzuela et al. who argue that the ISA role in settlement has grown substantially and, while policymaking power remains centralized, “non-profits have gained more importance” in the political sphere (2018, 72). For example, amongst upper-tier governments, Shields et al. note at the very least “growing recognition that settlement and integration occurs in a grounded way on a local level” (2014, 21). ISA services also indirectly affect attitudes towards immigration and diversity among Canadian-born voters. For this reason, Richmond and Omidvar note that “the provision of these services is essential both to ensuring the effective settlement of newcomers and maintaining public support for continuing high levels of immigration required for our labour force” (2003, 7).

a. Settlement services provided by non-profit ISAs

Though it is beyond the scope of this report to comprehensively account for all services provided by ISAs in Canada, a brief overview underscores the variety of ways in which ISAs foster resilience among newcomer clients. Stasiulus et al. note that the most common services provided by Ontario ISAs include “counseling, housing help and advocacy, language training, health services, employment help (general and specialized), programs for women (including domestic violence, workplace training, and other programs addressing isolation, programs for seniors and youth, reception houses, information/orientation sessions, referrals and settlement workers in schools” (2011,
For example, in a 2018 case study of service provision at an Ontario YMCA, Nakhaie identifies “1) information and orientation, 2) language and skill, 3) employment and 4) community connections” as the main spheres through which the YMCA empowers newcomer clients promoting resilience in settlement (2018, 143). By facilitating further access to social services and networks in Canada, support is beyond the first stages of settlement, and encompasses longer-term integration goals.

Best practices for ISAs dictate holistic services that cover the distinct needs of different newcomer groups. For example, Nakhaie notes that government-assisted and privately sponsored refugees identify more needs in “Canadian life, language and other skills training” than economic class immigrants (2018, 155). Others underscore the particular importance of psychosocial counselling and culturally safe physical health services for refugees in Canada (Navaratna 2014; Shields et al. 2014). Nakhaie finds that, despite differing circumstances prior to arrival, family class immigrants have “similar unmet service needs” as refugees in Canada and are less likely than economic stream applicants to be fluent in French or English, highly educated or arriving with skills highly valued in Canada’s labour market (2018, 155). Lastly, Nakhaie notes that independent economic class immigrants have “significantly higher service needs… in terms of access to professional networks” (2018, 155). In his view, this is consistent with reports of labour market exclusion and devaluation of foreign credentials in Canada. Literature also notes the distinct service needs and programming for newcomer women (Zhu 2016), youth (Kilbridge & Anisef 2001), Francophone newcomers (Bisson et al. 2011), seniors and LGBTQ+ communities (Cabral 2000). In tailoring service provision and providing a range of settlement services, ISAs deconstruct barriers to social inclusion and foster resilience in meeting the distinct needs of different newcomer communities.

b. Particular importance of ethno-specific agencies

Simich et al. define culturally competent settlement service provision as having three domains, including “awareness of attitudes (cognitive), values and biases (affective) and skills (behavioral),” finding that such attributes are essential in particular for health-related services (2005, 263). Unfortunately, agencies that serve many different types of clientele are less likely to specialize in any particular linguistic or cultural service provision. In a variety of ways, ethno-specific agencies are able to reach newcomers further removed from the mainstream, whose pathway to social inclusion is otherwise problematized by structural and social barriers. In doing so, ethno-specific ISAs are critical agents in facilitating better settlement outcomes for Canada’s most vulnerable newcomers and further fostering their resilience. For these reasons, Sadiq notes that ethno-specific ISAs are the “preferred mode of newcomer service” among settlement professionals (2004, 19), and Shan refers to these institutions as key “bottom up social forces” (2015, 24).

Examining ISA service demands in the Peel Region, Agrawal finds cultural sensitivity a major determinant in satisfaction with settlement services, and lack of shared language among the largest obstacles in delivering services to Peel newcomers.
Similarly, George found that linguistic and cultural incongruence to be a major barrier in settlement service utilization by African newcomers in Toronto (2002, 473). For this reason, many note that among the various ISA organizational structures, ethno-specific immigrant-serving agencies play a distinct role fostering resilience among newcomer clients. Their importance is rooted in a deeper understanding of client need and the lived experience of social exclusion particular to certain ethno-cultural groups or admission classes. Tilson notes that this “unique role” is largely rooted in shared culture and language (2010, 5). Cabral argues that ethno-specific agencies are also more likely to “be cognisant of the immigrant experience and needs arising from dislocation, disempowerment, racism and particular value systems which may not be met by the dominant culturally specific services” (2000, 12). Sadiq simply finds these organizations better able to “ground their service in client need” and expand operations via community outreach, the mobilization of community leaders and utilization of ethnic media (2004, 15). Furthermore, Sadiq finds that “ethno-specific ISAs are more easily accessible than large, multi-service ISAs, because they tend to be located in the neighborhoods of the communities they serve” (2004, 16). As Sadiq notes, ethno-specific agencies can also “act as a source of newcomer employment and volunteer experience, which fosters personal and professional development” and potentially links to external job opportunities (2004, 16). By facilitating such interactions, Biles et al. argue that these organizations serve as a “cross-cultural bridge” between clients and Canadian-born citizens (2011, 231).

c. ISAs in Quebec

Quebecois ISAs are also situated in the context of Quebec’s uniquely autonomous settlement and immigration policy. The province of Quebec maintains exclusive control over immigrant settlement and integration, and as MICC receives federal transfers they both directly provide public services and fund ISAs as frontline service-providers. Reichhold notes that, in comparison to the near “exclusive” reliance of the Canadian government on ISAs in other provinces, in Quebec the majority of services are provided by public institutions (2010, 40). For that reason, though some 50,000 newcomers use ISA services in Quebec, they remain, compared to the rest of Canada, a more “marginal force” based on allocated budgets (Reichhold 2010, 39). Germain and Trinh note that the third sector role in Quebec settlement occurs “under a distinctive partnership model with the state,” termed l’économie sociale, in which ISAs have arguably greater latitude for advocacy and autonomy (2011, 268). For Urtnowski et al., “these partnerships play a central role in Quebec’s integration program for immigrants, and through them the Quebec government laws and policies find expression (2012, 14). Richmond and Shields agree that Quebec’s community sector has had “unique success... in institutionalizing policies that protect its autonomy and provide a more positive framework for negotiating government funding” (2005, 520). Elsewhere, Richmond and Shields argue that negotiations between the Quebec government and ISAs specifically recognize “the importance, vitality and autonomy of the community sector” more widely than in the rest of Canada (2004, 20). For example, Evans and Shields find “it is only the Quebec government that provides direct funding to NGOs to do research and advocacy” independent of direct service provision in the effort to “carry out social action...
for purposes of change” (2014, 124). Basic funding, which was eliminated under NPM in the rest of Canada, is a core part of Quebec’s ISA government funding architecture. This provides the structural foundations for greater independence and autonomy on the part of the province’s ISAs.

Germain and Trinh outline some of the relationships between MICC and Quebecois ISAs thorough four major programs. The Reception Program for Newcomers offers over 60 community organizations three-year funding agreements for support services and labour market integration. In 2011, these funding arrangements were estimated at 7-9 million dollars. The Regional Integration Program focusses on regionalization initiatives, facilitating settlement outside of the major immigrant hub of Montreal. This project is undertaken with regional and municipal partners, as well as 18 community organizations. The Civic and Intercultural Relations Program also focuses on regional integration, involving over sixty unique community projects. Lastly, the Linguistic Integration Program for Immigrants funds FSL training in colleges, universities and community organizations. The province has developed a significant online learning platform, and includes a financial aid program to provide allowances for full-time FSL students (Germain and Trinh 2011, 260).

The Catholic Church was once the centerpiece of Quebec social services, but today in the wake of the ‘Quiet Revolution’ the church has a greatly diminished role. However, large foundations like the Centraide of Greater Montreal and the J.W McConnell Foundation have arisen as direct service providers and in support of smaller community-based ISAs. Germain and Trinh note that newcomers in Quebec rely on “a rich and diverse web of community-based organizations” which include mainstream, multi-service and ethno-specific agencies (2011, 269). Several authors highlight ISAs particular involvement in the sphere of employment and labour market integration (Germain and Trinh 2011; Pourier and Gagnon 2010). Pourier and Gagnon also note expanding interventions in “reducing drop-out rates (through homework programs, for instance), supporting child development, developing parenting skills and providing support for women” (2010, 192).

Urtnowski et al. note unique difficulties faced by English-speaking newcomers to Quebec, whose needs may not be met by the “predominantly French-speaking community sector” (2012, 14). Noting an informant opinion, they identify that only four or five active organizations that could be described as “English-speaking group” (Urtnowski 2012, 15). Consequently, according to Urtnowski et al, “those who speak French will have a great number of services readily available to them, while “Allophones” who have not yet learned to speak either official language will have greater difficulty making their way” (2012, 15).

While exceptional in many ways, ISAs in Quebec also experience issues familiar to the rest of Canada. Poirier and Gagnon argue that, “despite the existence of sectoral or neighborhood consensus-building,” poor coordination in Quebec’s settlement sector also problematizes service continuity between providers (2010, 193). While employment-focussed programming continues to expand, other programs are often
discontinued due to a lack of funding (2010, 192). Similarly, Germain and Trinh note that many community-based organizations are “feeling uncomfortable with the gap between increasing clientele and slow-growing budgets” (2011, 271). They suggest that Quebec still seeks “the right balance between community intervention, which is close to the clientele, and state intervention which is based on the logic of socialization and the logic of rationalization of public services – two logics that are sometimes inconsistent” (2011, 272). Quebec, alongside other Canadian provinces, will benefit by enabling such organizations to instill resiliency into their clientele, not only through employment focussed programming but through broader, holistic settlement service provision.

9. Effects of Neoliberalism in the Settlement Sector

Richmond and Shields argue that neoliberalism and the implementation of New Public Management governance is the root of a “policy crisis” in Canadian settlement and integration (2005). They argue that “this new system is not working...for the settlement sector or for the newcomers they serve; nor is it working for Canadian non-profit agencies as a whole” (2005, 518). These outcomes are intimately linked; where the settlement sector is made resilient so are its clients, and where the settlement sector operates precariously this too is passed to immigrants and refugees in Canada (Shields et al. 2017). For Richmond and Shields, this cycle of disadvantage is exacerbated by the “institutionalization of a kind of second-class, marginalized service system” in which visible minorities are made further invisible (2005, 520). Acheson and Laforest also point to the marginalization of ISAs as “tools that are expendable in policy dynamics” (2013, 599). In the long term, Shields and Evans note that by becoming a “shadow state” in settlement service, ISAs constitute a “buffer sector” and in fact “contribute to the silencing of voices” within newcomer communities by subsidizing the responsibilities of the state (2000, 13). Across relevant literature, scholars outline many specific ways in which neoliberal policies affect Canadian settlement services, broadly linking the undermining of ISAs in Canada to that of their newcomers clients.

a. Program loss and mission drift

Cabral suggests that, ideally, settlement services facilitate social inclusion where they are “delivered holistically and address the immigrant experience in its totality...” (2000, 13). However, programming losses as an effect of neoliberal restructuring and funder austerity threaten the comprehensive capacity for ISAs to engage with newcomer communities. In other words, as Richmond and Shields note, through the process of government controlled service contracts “services offered by the third sector are transformed” (2004, 8). In provinces host to large immigrant and refugee populations like Ontario and Quebec, Shields notes that ISAs have been asked to “do more with less” but in the process were unable to maintain holistic service provision (2004, 6). In particular, the loss of employment and training programs problematized newcomer labour market integration in the context of credential non-recognition (Shields 2004, 6). Elsewhere, Richmond and Shields note the third sector increasingly introducing fees for services, and replacing responsive community management with
“professionalized” services (2004, 8). Among ISAs in Ontario’s Peel Region, Mukhtar et al. find that funding loss spurred program cutbacks in spheres of childcare, evening language and training courses and youth outreach. Such programs, where available, are described as “especially helpful for women,” who are often unable to access daytime programming unless childcare is provided (Mukhtar et. al. 2015, 401). Similarly, Baines et al. note the particular ill-effect of losing “small and financially modest supports…” for low-income newcomers in including “public transport expenses, free childcare while utilizing services and the ability to offer a bit of light food to clients” (2014, 88). They suggest that these types of low cost supports are critical to “open the door” to broader service use such as language and labour market training, and that their loss is felt acutely among clients most vulnerable to social exclusion (2014, 88).

As a consequence of funding limitations, ISAs in Canada have few resources to pursue extra-contractual programming, and thus dependency on funders leads not only to restriction but also reshaping of available services. Sadiq notes that, as predominant ISA funder and the architect of contract requirements, “the government… exercises a good amount of social control over NGOs…” (2004, 5). Evans et al. similarly argue that “the contract funding scheme tends to impose government funding priorities on non-profit organizations dependent on state revenues,” as ISAs “juggle” their mandate to meet funding and contract agendas (2004, 81). Elsewhere, Richmond and Shields refer to this process as “mission drift” (2005, 518). For example, in a study of 12 ISAs serving Latin American migrants in Toronto, Trudeau and Veronis find that “NGOs focus their services on employment for migrants as a matter of competition and organizational survival,” specializing in services such as information technology and computer courses to match Ontario’s provincial mandates (2009, 1125). Shields et al. similarly find that settlement programming focusses primarily on “economic integration and measurable results” rather than longer-term settlement processes (2014, 19). This is reflective of neoliberal paradigms guiding Canadian public policy, in which employment and labour market training initiatives are emphasized to quicken the process of newcomer self-reliance. While employment initiatives are undoubtedly important, their exclusive prioritization directs scarce ISA time and money from other important spheres in health, social, cultural and linguistic services. In the long term, resilience can only be effectively fostered among newcomer clients where the complexities of settlement are addressed through comprehensive programming.

b. Neoliberalism and the non-profit advocacy role

Broadly, Shields and Evans note that third sector advocacy has been critical in “broadening the democratic experience in the post-war period,” as “governments guided by a reform liberal/social democratic framework provided funding for the advocacy role to allow for minority interests to be heard among economically powerful majorities” (2000, 5). In the settlement sector, many scholars in Canadian migration studies invoke the concept of a community voice in describing a non-profit role which extends far beyond direct service provision. Valenzuela et al., for example, argue that there are two core roles that ISAs fill; as service providers and “as a voice for the community” in advocating for social justice (2018, 77). In the neoliberal context of “these difficult and
austere times,” and in the context of anti-immigration movements worldwide, they suggest that such social justice missions are an especially important resource for newcomers in Canada (2018, 66). Similarly, Lowe et al. argue that ISAs “give voice to the communities they serve” and are thus fundamental in “making in integration a two-way street” (2017, 39). NGOs well beyond Canada continue to play important roles in promoting immigrant/migrant inclusion (Schnyder 2015).

Richmond and Shields agree that “the voice of these agencies has historically been essential in the development of settlement policy, in promoting community development with newcomer communities and in advocacy for anti-racism and equity” (2005, 519). Given that newcomers are subjected to social exclusion in various forms, and “especially since some 70% of them are identifiable minorities,” Evans and Shields suggest that ISAs “have a special role to play in giving voice to newcomer concerns and interests to government policymakers” (2014, 119). Alongside the “big advocacy” challenging government policy, they also consider “small advocacy” as “behind the scenes, day to day interface and consultation” between ISAs and government policymakers (2014, 119).

Valenzuela et al. note that “non-profits, where resources permit, are also engaged in various community-based educational activities aimed at promoting the benefits of immigration and in challenging populist xenophobic attitudes” (2018, 78). This “soft advocacy” is often “directed at society, rather than at government policies,” and thus is less controversial among upper-tier governments (Valenzuela et al. 2018, 78). However, alternative advocacies nonetheless require “the state accepting non-profit organizations as partners in a larger policy process” and as autonomous and politically significant actors in society (Evans and Shields 2014, 119). Advocacy of all shapes and sizes is problematized by underfunding of ISAs, as well as “vertical control and accountabilities that actually extend government regulation of the sector” (Evans and Shields 2014, 120).

A host of scholars are critical of the ways that “partnership” models of service delivery between the Canadian state and ISAs contribute to a “de-politicization” in the third sector (Valenzuela et al. 2018, 77). Baines et al. find that “the business model” of competitive, short-term state contracts does not recognize the non-profit advocacy role, rather this is seen to be “a case of ‘special interest’ activities which government funds should not be associated with” (2014, 79). In Ontario, for example, de-politicization became increasingly visible after the slashing of anti-racism and employment equity programming in 1995. In the early 2000s, Richmond and Omidvar suggested that neoliberal restructuring had begun to compromise “the basic mission of third sector organizations and therefore their ability to contribute to social inclusion” as funding dependency barred ISAs from developing and providing “an anti-discriminatory and an anti-racist framework for human services” (2003, 8). Though many ISAs still recognized the value of such programs, the shift from core/base to contract-based funding left little flexibility or resources for extra-contractual advocacy initiatives. Unfortunately, Stasiulus et al. find that the third sector is yet to recover from government disregard for programs
“directed at addressing the more systemic forms of inequality encountered by immigrants and racial minorities” (2011, 131).

In the mid-2000s, Richmond and Shields argued that “funding restrictions, lack of resources and an increasingly competitive environment” still “silenced” ISA advocacy initiatives in Ontario’s settlement sector (2005, 519). They found that where funders dictate competitive, short-term contracts, ISA advocacy work remained “detrimental to their chances of winning government contracts” and thus was heavily disincentivized (2005, 518). Today, little has changed. Valenzuela et al. recognize ISA “de-politicization” as a result of limited resources in the context of hesitancy among ISAs “to put themselves in a compromising position” with government funders (2018, 10). Evans and Shields also find that, in terms of advocacy and anti-racism initiatives, NGOs remain “hesitant to bite the hand that funds them” (2014, 125). Acheson and Laforest similarly note an enduring “advocacy chill” amongst ISAs both in Ontario and across Canada. To maintain institutional stability and achieve government funding, they suggest that “organizations must focus on service delivery at the expense of promoting political change” (Acheson and Laforest 2013, 607). For example, they note that many Ottawa ISAs “had seen funding rescinded because they engaged in advocacy or criticized government” (2013, 606).

The effects of long-term ISA “de-politicization” are deeply troubling, as the voices of marginalized communities become further removed from the Canadian political and social mainstream. More broadly, if unable to undertake advocacy initiatives, ISAs themselves become disconnected from their client communities and less able to effectively communicate the needs of newcomers to upper-tier government policymakers in Canada. Evans and Shields consider this larger “question of non-profit policy voice” in Ontario immigration and settlement policymaking, concluding that “the structures of neoliberal governance models remain embedded in Canadian provincial government and consequently NGO voice remains muffled” (2014, 125). Not only does this “curtail their autonomous capacity to offer alternative perspectives” and offer fresh insight in policymaking, but it threatens their role as “a voice for society” and lessens their ability to foster resilience within Canada’s newcomer communities (Shields and Evans 2000, 19).

c. Particular challenge to ethno-specific organizations

Importantly, neoliberal policy drift in Canada’s settlement sector and the shift to New Public Management governance has not affected all ISAs equally. Following Ontario’s settlement sector cutbacks in the 1990s, Sadiq estimates that funding losses in ethno-specific agencies were twice that of losses in multi-service agencies, and many smaller organizations were forced to close entirely (2004, 13). He attributes this disproportionate impact to the fact that, generally, larger mainstream and multi-service agencies “tend to have greater resources and superior management expertise,” and a heightened capacity to complete grant proposals and win government contracts (Sadiq 2004, 6). Sadiq additionally notes that from the government perspective, “larger agencies are considered best suited to provide services” and more likely to win
contracts (2004, 16). Shields et al. similarly find that the Canadian government prefers “larger, professionally-oriented, multi-service agencies over smaller, community-centric, ethno-specific providers” (2014, 22). According to Mukhtar et al., these agencies gain “modest autonomy” from funders as they are relatively less dependent, and abler to pass fundraising and additional costs to their diverse client communities (2015, 392). In Acheson and Laforest’s Ottawa-based study, one key informant noted that “You have to be serving everybody…an ethnic organization… is not going to go anywhere” (2013, 610).

Under New Public Management governance, in which “lowest cost is the desired outcome,” agencies large and small “can either abandon best practices in favour of lowest cost practices or continue to engage in best practice and operate at a deficit” (Sadiq 2004, 17). If ISAs refuse to compromise service quality, Sadiq notes that smaller agencies cannot afford to compete with their larger counterparts, “in spite of the fact that ethno-specific agencies provide services to emerging communities that larger agencies cannot” (2004, 16). For example, Neudorf finds that outcome reporting and accountability requirements sap less resources from larger and more established multi-service agencies, “both because they have greater organizational capacity…and also because many of them have developed better financial management and control systems over many years of partnership through contribution agreements with CIC [IRCC]” (2016, 99). In the spheres of administration, restructuring and negotiations, Richmond and Shields similarly find that “it is the larger, multi-service agencies that survive…” (2005, 517). As Shields et al. note, the clients who rely on ethno-specific organizations are more likely to be “particularly vulnerable immigrant populations who can be hard to reach and service through more standard service bodies” (2014, 23). It is these groups in particular who are made less resilient by Canada’s inability to support a large and diverse settlement sector.

d. Precarity in the settlement sector

Baines et al. define precarity as “lack of security and/or predictability most particularly as it relates to employment,” fostering “conditions of vulnerability, instability, marginality and temporariness” (2014, 75). Shields also links precarity to neoliberal policy changes, which have privatized welfare costs and simultaneously increased reliance on the labour market while saddling it with “insecure work and the risks of joblessness” (2004, 2). For Baines et al., precarity is bred through the third sector by neoliberal public policy, which operates to “download responsibility for care previously provided by the state onto local levels of government, non-profit bodies, communities and families” (2014, 77). They suggest that precarity operates on multiple, self-reinforcing levels in non-profit social services, including “that of the 1) non-profit labour force, 2) organizational structure and operation of non-profit agencies and 3) clients and the community serviced by these non-profits” (Baines et al. 2014, 75). In other words, “the deficit in funds, security and dependability at each level intensifies and reinforces the vulnerability of the next” as precarity affects both the workers and clients of non-profit organizations, including those involved with service provision for immigrants and
refugees in Canada (Baines et al. 2014, 89).

In Ontario’s Peel region, Mukhtar et al. find that ISA employees reported “increasing mental and emotional stress…due in part to the nature of the job (e.g working with clients who face challenges in integrating) and also to the pressure of being overworked in an underfunded organization” (2015, 401). For this reason, “frontline workers are… at risk of early job burnout thus increasing staff turnover and challenging the continuity of programming” (Mukhtar et al. 2015, 401). Many cite Shields’ (2014) concept of “permanent temporariness” within Canada’s settlement sector, which according to Lowe et al. occurs at the intersection of “under-funding and lack of long-term funding stability: employment insecurity; increased workloads (doing more with less); lack of promotion ladders, lower wages and minimal benefits; and, growth of unpaid and underpaid labour” (2017, 32). Richmond and Shields additionally suggest that “an environment of increased competition, need to work in multi-partner projects, increased accountability reporting, fewer committed and flexible volunteers, clients with more complex problems and the need to be computerized” has “strained the capacity of many community organizations to their very limits” (2004 11). As the norm becomes “increased demand without the staff to meet these needs,” agencies rely increasingly on volunteer labour, which ultimately cannot recoup funding shortfalls or meet the high demand for professional service provision (Richmond and Shields 2004, 11). The staff who remain bear heavier workloads, enjoy fewer benefits and are more likely to experience unstable, contract-based employment (Richmond and Shields 2004, 11).

Baines et al. argue that “too often… work has come to be viewed narrowly as primarily ‘a labour of love’ which is seen to be a reward in and of itself” (2014, 86). They suggest that while “organizational missions and values are important to attracting employees… this is not sufficient to provide a sustainable road to retention” and that “the underlying structural challenges of poor pay, overwork, burnout and employment instability” may indeed erode social justice orientation among non-profit and ISA staff (Baines et al. 2014, 86). Given this situation, Richmond and Shields project that “the problem of retention of quality staff will become increasingly significant and difficult in the future,” further disabling ISAs in fostering resilience effectively among newcomer clients (2004, 12).

Neudorf notes that, in terms of federal funding, “the conditions of the Settlement Program prioritize direct services” (Neudorf 2016, 102). In 2016, this meant that only 15% of the national settlement budget can be used for program support and administration, and only 10% for indirect service provision and sector development (Neudorf 2016, 102). Paradoxically, as the administrative burden of ISAs has increased, funding for such activities has simultaneously been curtailed. Neudorf’s community-sector informants noted that such limitations on administrative expenditure “creates a struggle to survive” as agencies are unable to attain economies of scale in administrative tasks (2016, 103). To address these issues, they claimed that “organizations will try to take on too many programs in search of more administrative funding” (Neudorf 2016, 103). In terms of sectoral development, an IRCC informant noted that “of approximately $600 million for settlement services outside of Quebec,
only about $60 million is available for all professional development activities, conferences, umbrella organizations, consultations and intra-sectoral coordination” (Neudorf 2016, 102). In effect, federal divestment in professional development in Canada’s settlement sector works to exacerbate the negative effects of overburden and underfunding. Conversely, as Neudorf’s key informants note, “putting more resources towards capacity-building activities would improve the benefits of the programs [their organizations] already delivered,” improving the effectiveness of services per dollar of federal funding (Neudorf 2016, 103). Thus, while the “disproportionate prioritization” of direct services is underwritten by cost-cutting measures at the heart of neoliberal restructuring, this divestment may indeed be counterproductive (Neudorf 2016, 103).

Across the literature, parallels are often drawn between non-profit employees and their clients in terms of precarity and marginalization. This is partially because, as Baines et al. note, “the sector’s workforce in many instances is actually drawn out of the populations that are serviced by these organizations” (2014, 83). Jayaraman and Bauder argue that “the immigrant service sector is a special case as an employer of immigrants” in that on one hand, “immigrant service agencies and institutions are keenly aware of the social, cultural and institutional challenges immigrants face in the labour market” while on the other, the sector “may provide only low pay, long hours, unfavourable working conditions and limited career advancement opportunities to immigrant workers” (2013, 179). They argue that neoliberal restructuring has segmented ISA-employed newcomers into lower tiers of the labour market, increasing their precarity and lessening their capacity to contribute experiential expertise.

Jayaraman and Bauder also point out that “shrinking and volatile funding” in the Canadian settlement sector has particular implications for newcomer and racialized women who provide the bulk of frontline services (2013, 19). Similarly, Lowe et al. argue that while the proportion of ISA staff who are newcomers themselves remains “an important link in helping ISAs keep close to immigrant clients,” it is also “reflective of the problem faced by so many immigrant newcomers in that they become employed in lower waged and precarious employment, a factor that marks ISA employment patterns” (2017, 32). A respondent from Lowe et al.’s 2017 study noted that “organizations that serve marginalized groups are themselves marginalized” in that “ISA staff composition is largely immigrant and female dominated, and agencies are not afforded the same support as other sub-sectors in the non-profit community-service sector” (32).

Even where newcomers are not directly employed by an ISA, restructuring may indirectly support their segmentation into precarious labour markets. For example, Shan finds that “funder demands for accountability…exert pressure on organizations to link immigrant women with ‘accessible jobs’ that may be low paid or not commiserate with their qualifications” (2015, 25). Furthermore, ISA newcomer clients are critically affected by the erosion of productive capacity amongst ISA staff. For example, Baines et al. find that employment precarity and vulnerability in the non-profit sector problematizes long-term planning, institutional memory and program continuity “as staff are unlikely to be around to actualize these plans or feel they have the overview to set goals for a very unstable future,” (2014, 84). Shields et al. note that this system results in “less innovation and ability to proactively address the evolving needs of immigrants” (2014,
20). As agencies become less effective and distanced from client communities, they also become less resilient to austere conditions in the sector and vulnerable to further funding cutbacks or program elimination. In addition to the physical and material consequences of these losses, Simich et al. find that structural limitations on service provision negatively affects newcomer mental well-being by “increasing feelings of loneliness and social isolation, loss of identity, discouragement (e.g., about seeking employment) and lack of knowledge of available options” (2005, 263). Richmond and Shields find that, through this “perverse kind of interaction,” resilience is sapped and precarity multiplied with “the clients experiencing more general problems due to growing poverty and cutbacks in income support, the agencies coping with limited and restrictive funding and staff labouring under increasingly exploitative conditions” (2005, 520).

10. Growing Municipal and Community Role in Integration and Settlement

Though responsibilities in immigration and settlement policymaking are constitutionally shared under provincial and federal jurisdiction, resettlement in Canada has long been an urban phenomenon. For this reason, Papillion notes that “rapid change is taking place at the municipal level” in terms of settlement and integration (2002, 19). Canada’s 2016 Census reported that Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver are the place of residence of over half of all immigrants (61.4%) and recent immigrants (56.0%) in Canada” (Statistics Canada 2017). Rose and Preston point to the paradox that though “Canadian cities…benefit when immigrants succeed but deal with the fallout when they struggle to find jobs commiserate with their qualifications, have difficulties locating affordable housing and encounter challenges settling family members,” municipalities have traditionally assumed a “subordinate role” to upper-tier government stakeholders as “creatures of the provinces” (2017, 30). Ultimately, they find that “current constitutional arrangements mandate little official involvement for municipalities in immigration and settlement policies,” and the recognition of municipal expertise has not led to a greatly heightened role in policymaking (Rose and Preston 2017, 30). If newcomers are to be resilient through the challenges of settling in Canada, Canada’s cities as their primary resettlement sites must also be strengthened to provide critical facilities and services through the long settlement process.

Paralleling the third sector, many scholars link the expansion of municipal responsibilities in the delivery of social services not only to devolution processes but to a larger subsidizing of the welfare state. Mwaringa notes that, following neoliberal restructuring in Ontario during the 1990s, municipalities “now shoulder a heavier burden of responsibility for essential social services” and have “increasingly become the place where citizens access key services such as health, recreation, education and social services” (2002, 1). Some argue that the further incorporation of local forces in settlement has fostered local resilience through better settlement outcomes. For instance, McGrath and McGrath find that under the former federal-provincial immigration agreement in British Columbia, provincial autonomy led to latitude for greater municipal engagement in language training and refugee-specific programming among other spheres, ultimately increasing “flexibility and innovation” of settlement
services (2013, 13). Yet, devolution of settlement to municipalities is also viewed critically in the context of upper-tier government neoliberal policy shift, and Stasiulus et al. note that it is not “in and of itself a public good” (2011, 132). In Ontario, for example, they tie the “erosion of Keynesian social welfare arrangements experienced at all levels of the Canadian state,” and the subsequent downloading of responsibilities to the municipal level to “devastating” effects on services for immigrants and refugees (Stasiulus et al. 2011, 81). They find that “cities and suburbs, whose growth is attributable in large part to immigration, currently face formidable challenges in providing appropriate, accessible, equitable and comprehensive forms of settlement assistance to a large and diverse infusion of newcomers” (2011, 79). These informal downloading processes also problematized intergovernmental relations, and according to Biles et al. explain “why municipalities and non-governmental partners remain skeptical of the provincial government” in Ontario (2011, 203).

Ultimately, scholars suggest newcomer settlement has become an “unfunded mandate” in Canadian municipalities (Stasiulus et al. 2011, 83), in which upper-government settlement policies play out at the community level but “not with corresponding fiscal support” (Biles et al. 2011, 203). In Ontario’s Peel Region, for example, Mukhtar et al. find that “as immigration rapidly changes population levels, municipalities… are left to manage and fund the provision of social, public and transit infrastructure to support additional people while being kept on the periphery of settlement decisions” (2015, 405). Cities have become overburdened and underfunded in a manner comparable to non-profit ISAs. Nonetheless, Canada’s municipalities have themselves proved resilient to these challenges, becoming key stakeholders in newcomer settlement and integration. Stasiulus et al., among others, find “municipalities increasingly active in the immigrant settlement field” both in immigrant-specific and diversity initiatives more broadly (2011, 95).

a. The Special Case of the City of Toronto

As Canada’s largest newcomer hub of settlement, many authors note Toronto’s municipal involvement in settlement to be exceptional (See Praznik and Shields 2018b). Papillion recalls that in the late 1990s, “the Ontario government transferred to the municipal government of the amalgamated City of Toronto the responsibility for a number of social services vital to immigrants’ settlement process, such as social assistance, social housing, childcare and public health” (2002, 18). Stasiulus et al. tie these processes to broader neoliberal cost-cutting in Ontario, finding the 1998 Toronto amalgamation, “whereby the city claimed annual savings (in 2003) of 136.5 million,” to be “a prime example of NPM” (2011, 89). However, as Papillion notes, “without the corresponding transfer of revenue,” Toronto is challenged to develop effective, long-term plans for newcomer residents (2002, 20). More broadly, Biles et al. argue that “municipal involvement in immigration poses interesting questions about subsidiary and the level of government that should be responsible for settlement services” (2011, 238).

Despite challenges in funding, Stasiulus et al. are among many to make a particular note of the City of Toronto as exemplary in providing informal settlement services,
finding that the city maintains “the most developed and long-standing set of diversity strategies… likely of all Canadian cities” (2011, 100). Siemiatycki outlines programming in key municipal agencies including the Toronto District School Board, Toronto Public Health, Toronto Public Libraries and the Toronto Police Service, finding that “no municipal service field has remained unchanged by the massive global migration that has settled in the city in recent decades” (2012, 35). In 2007, the City articulated its position on equitable access to City of Toronto services for all residents regardless of legal or immigration status, finally declaring itself a “Sanctuary City” through the 2013 Access T.O policy (Hudson et al. 2017, 3). While Hudson et al. criticize Access T.O as “a pilot project rather than a full policy” in light of Toronto Police Service non-compliance (2017, 3), Siemiatycki argues that this policy also comprises “an assertion of urban citizenship” and underscores Toronto’s autonomy in immigration and settlement (2012, 35). Such moves may also be though of measures that address ‘migrant mobility justice’, associated with international mobility rights movements (Sheller 2018). The growing problem with refugees and their need for asylum and moves by state to illegalize various migrant populations (Hannan 2016; Schierup & Jørgensen 2018) migrant mobility justice has grown in importance becoming “one of the crucial political and ethical issues of our day” (Sheller 2018, 1).

Good invokes urban theorist Clarence Stone’s “regime theory” to argue that Toronto has led regional settlement initiatives through an “urban regime” of “public-private coalitions …whereby local leaders pool resources to create the capacity to develop and implement local policy agendas” (2007, 1). In particular, she examines the ways in which Toronto’s post-amalgamation “New Deal for Cities” movement influenced the establishment of the Toronto Region Immigrant Employment Council (TRIEC) “to help deal with one of the most important challenges facing newcomers- access to employment” (2007, 10). Though TRIEC eventually grew “polyscalar” to incorporate all three levels of government, ISAs and private sector employers, Good finds the city instrumental in this coordinating effort in absence of upper-tier government coordination and funding (2007, 10).

In 2002, Mwaringa argued that Toronto’s heightened role in newcomer integration and settlement called for “a comprehensive policy and planning framework which delivers benefits equally both to local host communities and new immigrants” (2). He believed that Toronto was “uniquely positioned to pioneer the development of an urban settlement policy and coordinated settlement service delivery framework” due to its high immigrant population, and suggested a heightened role for all Canadian cities “with respect to planning, accountability and effective delivery of settlement services” in partnership with upper-tier governments and ISAs (2002, 6). To some extent, this vision was recognized through the tripartite Canada-Ontario-Toronto Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) accompanying COIA in 2005, which committed all levels of government to greater cooperation in newcomer access to employment, education and training, services and citizenship and civic engagement (Stasiulus et al. 2011, 103).

According to Rose and Preston, the MOU “promotes a comprehensive and sustained relationship between the federal, provincial and local governments in the area
of immigration and settlement” (2017, 32) For them, it remains “qualitatively different from other federal-provincial immigration agreements that call for municipal partnerships and dialogue between provincial and municipal governments” by elevating the City as a signatory partner (Rose and Preston 2017, 32). To date, Toronto is the only municipality signatory to a MOU of this nature. For Biles et al., “the engagement of the three levels of government... unquestionably marks a departure for Ontario” in terms of collaborative policy development, movement to actively engage municipalities was “the principal success of the Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement” (2011, 206). Stasiulus et al. also find the MOU a “strategically important milepost changing the scalar relations of government, representing for municipalities ‘a little Trojan horse” (2011,103). However, they remain critical of capacity of this agreement to substantially “challenge the federal government primacy in immigration policy” (2011, 104). Similarly, Rose and Preston’s 2017 study finds that while municipal representatives were pleased by the empowerment embodied in the MOU, “there is some dissatisfaction” remaining among the immigrant-serving sector. Ultimately, they suggest that “as the City of Toronto deepened its interactions with federal and provincial officials, non-governmental organizations lost opportunities to advocate with the City,” and that “despite its participation in consultations, the City cannot protect the sector’s interest” (2017, 36). Though this new partnership has the potential to bolster the resilience of municipalities and their resident community organizations, unilateral, top-down federalism “compounds the challenges of planning effective services for immigrants” in Canada’s cities (Rose and Preston 2017, 35).

b. Regionalization and Challenges of Settlement in Small Communities

While newcomers still settle predominantly in the urban metropoles of Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver, Statistics Canada’s 2016 Census demonstrated increasing movement towards Canada’s secondary cities across the provinces. Alberta’s share of new immigrants rose by 10.2% between 2001 and 2015, with shares in Manitoba and Saskatchewan rising from 3.4% and 3% respectively. Between 2001 and 2016, each province in Atlantic Canada received its largest number of new immigrants, doubling the share of recent immigrants settling on the East Coast in the last 15 years. At the same time, percentages of recent immigrants fell in provinces home to Canada’s largest immigrant hubs, by 5.4% in British Columbia and by 16.9% in Ontario. Only Quebec maintained the status quo, remaining home to about a quarter of Canada’s recent newcomers since 2001 (Statistics Canada 2017). Surely the rise, success and expansion of the Provincial Nominee Program in Prairie Provinces and in Atlantic Canada have influenced newcomer settlement patterns. Secondary migration of immigrants after landing, however, which is not systematically tracked by governments, does reduce the actual numbers of migrants that ultimately settle in the Atlantic Provinces and Quebec.

The relative strength of provincial economies and labour market conditions also influences newcomer settlement. As newcomer communities grow and become established beyond Toronto and Vancouver, settlement elsewhere is increasingly incentivized for later arrivals (Statistics Canada 2017). Within these provinces, scholars
like Mukhtar et al. also note “a growing tendency for new immigrants to bypass the inner city and settle directly in the outer suburbs” (2015, 393). In Ontario, for example, Stasiulus et al. examine the Peel Region, Ottawa, Niagara and Waterloo to find that secondary, suburban and smaller municipalities have become active stakeholders through a wide range of in settlement and integration initiatives (2011). Lo et al. (2015) have conducted an in-depth examination of the York Region looking at social infrastructure and their deficits for immigrant populations.

The apparent decentralizing patterns of newcomer settlement have long been a federal prerogative in Canada. Bauder and Flynn cite a 2001 CIC report titled *Towards a More Balanced Distribution of Immigrants* as inciting discussion regarding “what both the federal and provincial jurisdictions could do to promote the dispersal of immigrants away from Canada’s first-tier cities towards second and third-tier cities” (2015, 542). Scholars suggest that these policy concerns arose from perceived economic and demographic benefits of young, skilled immigrants settling in smaller communities as well as doubts about the capacity of Canada’s largest cities to successfully resettle the broad majority of newcomers (Richmond and Omidvar 2003; Stasiulus et al. 2011). Others situate these policies within the neoliberal context. Flynn and Bauder, for example, note that regionalization policies “dovetail” with neoliberal logics in that newcomer regionalization is also a “a cost-saving measure” through which settlement responsibilities are devolved more broadly across provinces and municipalities (2015, 502). In 2002, Immigration Minister Denis Coderre “raised the profile of regionalization and made it one of his priorities” (Metropolis 2003, 4). That year, he forwarded a controversial and ultimately untenable “dispersion policy” through a temporary work visa tied to residence in a particular location (Richmond and Omidvar 2003, 16). Richmond and Omidvar note, such proposals “contribute to the exclusion rather than the inclusion of a segment of Canadian newcomers” in restricting mobility rights and freedoms (2003, 16). Quebec’s provincial government has also been receptive to regionalization strategies, and MICC maintains a Regional Integration Program with regional, municipal partners and community-based partners outside the immigrant hub of Montreal (Germain and Trinh 2011, 266).

While regionalization strengthens smaller and rural communities in the context of population and economic decline, authors note that particular challenges in settlement beyond Canada’s multicultural metropoles both for newcomer communities and the ISAs that support them. For example, Richmond and Omidvar note that newcomers in smaller and rural communities undertake settlement without the intrinsic benefits of urban life including “economic opportunities, social and cultural diversity and cultural support from communities of their own ethno-racial origins” (2003, 16). Comparing Ontario’s immigrant hub of Toronto with relatively smaller regions and municipalities, Stasiulus et al. find that smaller centers attempt to meet newcomer needs through “a considerably more fragmented and less robust organizational infrastructure” (2011, 74). Some argue that Canada’s secondary cities are uniquely positioned to rise to this challenge. In Hamilton, Ontario, Satzewich and Schaffir argue that a lack of ISAs “with deep historical roots and accompanying interests in monopolizing immigrant services” might introduce innovation into the relatively small sector (2007, 122). At the same time,
it is clear that ISAs are critically underrepresented and under-resourced in the increasingly diverse Canadian suburbs. In terms of funding, Lim et al. find that agencies in traditionally immigrant-rich cities like Toronto “had access to a greater range of funding opportunities” as compared to suburban municipalities (2005, 20). Sadiq demonstrates the ways in which “spatial mismatch” problematizes the extension of ethno-specific agencies and their distinct services to new regions of settlement including Canada’s suburbs and small towns (2004, 2). For example, Lo et al. examine the Greater Toronto Area’s York region, an area of “multiple vulnerabilities” including recent immigrants, refugees, low-income and senior populations (2015, 43). They find this region critically under-serviced by ISAs large and small, noting that that the least-serviced municipalities in this area host the largest populations of newcomers (Lo et al. 2015, 28). Lo et al. also conclude that less than a third of immigrants in the York region are aware of and actually use settlement services. Those unaware are more likely to be female, elderly, and less educated. Ultimately, they tie a lack of critical social infrastructure, including ISAs, to the loss of resilience and reinforcement of “vulnerability in the suburbs” (Lo et al. 2015, 2).

Examining Ontario’s Peel Region, Mukhtar et al. suggest that the “dominant narrative” of suburban affluence leads to an imbalance of federal resource distribution and settlement services, which remain concentrated in immigrant-receiving cities (2015, 393). In their 2015 study, Mukhtar et al. focus on challenges facing suburban ISAs in navigating government funding and policy, uncovering barriers in restrictive funding and mandates, eligibility criterion, mandatory client quotas, competition between service providers and poor structure and continuity. While these issues are also familiar among inner-city ISAs, Mukhtar et al. conclude that the geographic inaccessibility of suburban ISAs contributes in particular to “locational and transportation-related challenges” among newcomer clients (2015, 404). This also speaks to the issue of ‘mobility justice’ (Sheller 2018). In 2016, Ashton et al. conducted a similar study in examining the organizational capacity of small, medium-sized and remote Canadian communities. Overall, their findings point to “less than adequate capacities” in all three types of communities, particularly in terms of government and non-government funding, staff capability, service delivery in both official languages, mobilizing community support and strategic planning (2016, 85). Notably, small communities stood out as having the lowest capacities within these categories. Ashton et al. tie these findings to the fact that ISAs are busy “trying to reactively respond to the daily (and even hourly) demands of clients and have not been able to invest in governance and strategic planning” (2016, 86).

More broadly, many authors contextualize the challenges faced by suburban ISAs within Canada’s neoliberal policy and funding regime, in which contracts and budgets are inflexible to additional expenses such as subsidizing of client transportation or extensive outreach programs (Ashton et al. 2016; Mukhtar et al. 2015). This is consistent with Shields et al.’s findings that transportation and distance to services remain major barriers for newcomers in accessing settlement services (2014, 18). Again, these issues particularly exacerbate barriers for vulnerable groups including youth, women, and low-income newcomer clients, who become less likely to access key
services. Mukhtar et al. argue that the inability to connect with widespread client communities threatens the mission, sustainability and organizational resilience of suburban ISAs in immigrant-rich suburbs (2015, 402). Alongside many studies in this field, their findings support the particular need for increased, stable, multi-year government funding in settlement organizations outside of Canada’s urban centers (2015). As Ashton et al. conclude, “a strong settlement sector, not only in large cities but also in rural and remote communities, is a key asset for the community to attract, welcome and retain newcomers,” and to foster their resilience to the unique challenges of settlement beyond Canada’s urban centers (2016, 70).

11. Third Sector Partnerships and Coalitions

a. Partnerships between multi-service and ethno-specific ISAs

In response to budgetary constraints in the neoliberal context, Acheson and Laforest note that some small, ethno-specific agencies “willingly adapt to the new governance requirements” by altering their institutional infrastructure (2013, 611). For example, analyzing Ontario’s settlement sector following in 2005, they find that “the organizations benefitting from the new influx of resources were those willing to position themselves as multi-purpose organizations providing a wide range of functions and willing to scale up their activities to cater to a wide range of constituencies” (2013, 610). However, as aforementioned, many small and ethno-specific agencies lack the resources to upscale their organization. In this situation, many partner with larger agencies through shared activities, formal partnerships, co-locations and knowledge transfer in order to continue providing services in the community. To some extent, as Sadiq notes, “ethno-specific ISAs may be strengthened through collaborative partnerships that increase their overall capacity and attract external funding,” and that in some cases, “services to the broader newcomer community are enhanced owing to the combination of resources” (2004, 18). Acheson and Laforest suggest that partnerships “buffer” ethno-specific ISAs from upper-tier government austerity (2013, 607), and Lowe et al. observe that, better coordination across the sector helps to “achieve a common end-goal of supporting immigrants and refugees to successfully settle and succeed” (2017, 31). Trudeau and Veronis similarly suggest that “partnerships enable NGOs to specialize in the provision of specific services and become more professionalized in their management” (2009, 1127). By bolstering finances, human resources and capacity for service provision, cooperation in the sector can ensure that both multi-service and ethno-specific ISAs are resilient to upper-tier government austerity and NPM governance.

Collaboration amongst ISAs is also a prerogative for the federal government, and Tilson cites the 2009 CIC [IRCC] Guide for Applications for Settlement Program Funding in that “two or more organizations will be able to take on a larger project than a single organization could alone” (2010, 12). Mukhtar et al. similarly note that “IRCC expects coordination of services to minimize duplication of services in a particular catchment area” (2015, 400). ISA collaboration also fits into a neoliberal cost-cutting
scheme in which ISAs subsidize one another’s cost to some extent and lessen the federal burden in settlement service funding. According to Neudorf, “collaborative efforts mitigate risk for the funder” by reducing the overall cost of service delivery (2016, 101).

Unfortunately, many find that the conditions in the settlement sector that make cooperation amongst ISAs necessary simultaneously problematize it. For Sadiq, in the context of funding austerity, many of these partnerships evolve into “two-tier dependency” in which multi-service agencies rely on government contracts for funding and “subcontract settlement work to ethno-specific agencies which possess the ‘ethnic capital’ (shared language, ethnicity and culture) that multi-service agencies are unable to offer” (2004, 6). Paradoxically, “in the same way that large social service agencies have been forced to accept competitive purchase-of-service agreements with the provincial government, ethno-specific ISAs are now subject to competitive purchase-of-service agreements with multi-service ISAs” (Sadiq 2004, 18). In this situation, ethno-specific ISAs are vulnerable to a double bind of financial dependency, “subject to everyday and social control of their so-called collaborative partners” both within the sector and the Canadian government (2004, 27). Yet, Sadiq notes a variety of negative experiences in such partnerships stemming from differences in relative resources, mutual distrust, differing mandates and concerns about co-optation (2004, 19). Evans and Shields warn of an “erosion of trust between service agencies” overall (2014, 124), and Lowe et al. similarly suggest that competition for limited resources “has contributed to the difficulty the sector has in coordinating, collaborating, sharing a common vision and fighting back together” (2017, 31).

Even where collaboration is possible, Acheson and Laforest find that ISAs “identify with each other mainly as providers of services” rather than on the ground of “shared mandates in terms of inclusion, participation, social protection and rights protection” (2013, 612). As a result, many found it difficult to engage in “longer-term solidarities and collective projects” (Acheson and Laforest 2013, 612). In Mukhtar et al.’s study of Peel region ISAs, participants added that mandatory quotas in some programs and services exacerbated the “atmosphere of competition between settlement service organizations” (2015, 400). In an Ontario-wide study of the Toronto, Peel, Ottawa, Waterloo and Niagara regions, Stasiulus et al. find that in all cities surveyed “funding, especially from government sources, is a key determinant for the shape of inter-organizational relations in the non-government sector…” (2011, 108).

Ultimately, partnership within Canada’s settlement sector is neither inherently good nor bad in terms of bolstering newcomer resilience. Greater coordination amongst ISAs reduces overlap in services, allows for economy of scale in administrative processes, and fosters innovation. This bolsters the resilience of ISAs in the neoliberal policy context, and therefore positively affects newcomer clients. However, many scholars also note the value of a heterogeneous settlement sector. Shields et al. argue that “part of the value of non-profit service sector is the plurality of organization and service forms they come in... In the case of settlement services, it is important to acknowledge that one size does not fit all and non-profit service providers are uniquely positioned to fill such divergent needs.” (2014, 23). They further suggest that, as
aforementioned, “smaller ethno-specific agencies continue to fill an important role in non-profit delivery with the ability to connect to particularly vulnerable immigrant populations who can be hard to reach through more standard service bodies” (2014, 23). At the same time, Lowe et al. remind us that ISAs are critical to newcomer resilience, but are not binary, additionally including “community healthcare clinics, legal clinics…post-secondary institutions and faith-based services” among other private and public interests (2017, 34). To meet the needs of Canada’s newcomers and equip them with the resilience to settle successfully, ISAs, big and small, must have the flexibility to coordinate where it is beneficial, while preserving the integrity of institutional mandates which best serve their unique clientele.

**b. Umbrella coalitions in the third sector**

While partnerships between individual ethno-specific and multi-service settlement service agencies offer both benefits and consequences for participants, many praise sector-wide collaboration as best practice in newcomer settlement. Tilson, for example, suggests that by pooling collective resources, agencies are better able to plan and provide services (2010). In a broader sense, he finds that inter-sector collaboration allows agencies to share knowledge, involve the private sector and increase their own capacity through solidarity in terms of wages and working conditions (Tilson 2010, 9). Evans and Shields note that ISA coalitions in Ontario, British Columbia and Saskatchewan establish direct lines of communication with provincial and federal governments, facilitating dialogue among diverse stakeholders in settlement which is “generally more effective” than that of an individual agency (2014, 123). Germain and Trinh note that the “Table de concertation des organismes au service des personnes réfugiées et immigrantes” (TCRI) serves a similar role in Quebec, uniting over 125 organizations with shared interests in “services, assistance, support, sponsorship, reflection or solidarity” for immigrants and refugees across the province (2011, 270). Across Canada, Stasiulus et al. note the importance of the Canadian Council for Refugees as an umbrella organization uniting the refugee-serving third sector (2011, 111). In Ottawa, Acheson and Lafort et al. credit the Local Agencies Serving Immigrants coalition as a mode of resistance, which has “rechanneled social forces” and “altered governance dynamics” by binding ISAs together, noting the particular importance of this group for smaller ethno-specific organizations with less resources to draw upon (2013, 408). Several authors note that the continued development of such groups remains a federal and provincial priority, as policymakers also find it is simpler “to deal with a single sector voice” in consultation initiatives (Evans and Shields 2014, 123) rather than “dealing with a cacophony of a thousand disgruntled agency voices” (Stasiulus et al. 2011, 111).

Where individual agencies remain vulnerable to critical funding cuts, umbrella organizations have become entrenched in the landscape of the Canadian settlement sector and are uniquely placed as advocates for policies in the interests of their own institutional resilience and that of their newcomer clients. For this reason, Lowe et al. argue that umbrella agencies are effective actors in “soft advocacy,” lobbying government partners through working groups, settlement councils and multi-sectoral
The Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants (OCASI) is widely noted as the predominant umbrella organization responsible for strengthening the collective voice of the settlement sector in Canada’s largest province of newcomer settlement. Stasiulus et al. recall that OCASI was formed to shield ISAs from in “the complexities and volatil...
Stasiulus et al. indicate skepticism about the influence of third sector umbrella organizations in actual policymaking. In their 2011 study, one ISA informant mentioned that “consultations are becoming information dispersal…” and that ultimately the policymaking process remains top-down and directive in nature (2011, 111). Similarly, Lowe et al.’s study suggests the perception among umbrella coalition participants is that such initiatives are “increasingly monitored and controlled” by government participants (2017, 36). While umbrella agencies like OCASI are a distinct and powerful resource for ISAs looking to asserting their own institutional resilience and that of their clients within the neoliberal policy context, in assessing their effectiveness such factors must also be considered.

12. Other Actors in Canadian Resettlement

While federal, provincial and municipal governments and their ISA partners are key actors in Canadian resettlement, available literature points to a broadening array of actors invested in newcomer settlement and resilience. Serving as intermediaries between the government and ISAs through financial and practical support, these actors are prominent features in a field marked by its multi-sectorial nature. Their participation in this process affects newcomers directly and in supporting ISA capacity, fostering resilience for individuals and agencies alike.

a. Foundations

In the context of upper-tier government austerity (Barass and Shields 2017), several authors point to the key role played by non-profit foundations and universal service providers. These non-profit organizations are often funders themselves, channeling resources to smaller multi-service and ethno-specific ISAs. Stasiulus et al. note that “given the several restrictions attached to federal settlement and official language funding (pertaining to years in Canada, immigration status, e.g refugee claimants),” agencies “regularly supplement” federal funding with outside funding from local and national foundations such as Maytree and the United Way (2011, 108). In a comprehensive survey of Toronto-region ISAs, Lim et al. found the United Way to be a particularly prevalent funder funding over 60% of surveyed agencies and second only to the federal government (2005,17). In their Ontario-based study, the Maytree Foundation and Ontario Trillium also emerged as key funders of over 20% of surveyed ISAs (2005,17). Biles et al. note the particular importance of the Maytree Foundation as the pioneer of three pilot initiatives with “an important impact on integration and inclusion in Ontario” including DiverseCity Counts, an initiative focusing on racial diversity in public, non-profit and corporate leadership positions, the Assisting Local Leaders with Immigrant Employment Strategies program (ALLIES) as well as the Toronto Region Immigrant Employment Council (TRIEC) (2011, 229). Similarly in Quebec, Germain and Trinh note that along with the Quebec state, civil society foundations have come to replace the traditional role of the Church in social services (2011, 268). In the immigrant hub of Montreal, for example, The Centraide of Greater Montreal has become “a key player in issues of immigrant integration,” focusing on building “collaborative...
communities” in support of local ISAs (Germain and Trinh 2011, 268). In Quebec, the J.W McConnell foundation is also noted as a regional partner to Ontario’s Maytree, launching a twin ALLIES program in 2007.

b. Research Institutions and Universities

In the neoliberal era, scholars note that the broad devolution in newcomer settlement has also spread into the sphere of post-secondary education and research institutions. Bauder and Flynn examine the ways in which Canadian universities increasingly provide formal and informal settlement services for international students (2015). However, Evans and Shields suggest that the research role in settlement is also evolved as the federal government became receptive to “evidence-based policymaking” and the need to reinforce policy with solid research (2014, 11). Among Canada’s third sector, they also note “broad recognition” of the value of solid research in immigrant and refugee communities, as ISAs often cannot undertake these initiatives due to budgetary limitations (Evans and Shields 2014, 124). By partnering with universities and academics, ISAs are able to reinforce their own understanding of service needs within client communities. More broadly, ISAs are also acutely aware of “the value that the government places on interventions in policy issues that are informed by strong research,” leveraging university and academic partnerships to access new streams of funding (Evans and Shields 2014, 124). From the government perspective, Evans and Shields argue that “the university connection counter balances, at least to some degree, the idea often held in government that non-profit views are not well informed by evidence and are value charged and self-interested” (2014, 124). The benefits of research to service agencies are thus “multi-fold,” as agencies are able to augment their research ability, enhance interventions with government, and amplify their voice in provincial and federal policymaking (2014, 125; Shields et al. 2015). In an independent study undertaken by Lowe et al., ISA informants noted that “agencies that use research to build a strong case for their research appear to be enjoying greater access to funding streams” from upper-tier governments (2017, 38). Social Planning Toronto and the Maytree Foundation are among many organizations that fund academic and research partnerships crucial in “helping the sector measure success, come into public policy arenas and influence governments” (Lowe et al. 2017, 38). By better harnessing existing research and collaborating on targeted studies in the future, linkages between community service providers and academic researchers strengthen Canada’s settlement sector and bolster it against funding limitations. This resilience is passed to newcomers where ISAs are enabled to better serve their client communities.

Shields and Evans exemplify the research role that Metropolis Canada played as a hub in creating, gathering, mobilizing and transferring of knowledge among multi-sectoral stakeholders (2012). Emerging from a 1995 call by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC), an “arms-length government funding agency” in collaboration with CIC/IRCC, Metropolis Canada united government, academics and ISAs and other civil society organizations through research in immigration and settlement (Shields and Evans 2012, 263). In Ontario, this project emerged as CERIS: The Ontario Metropolis Centre, and were described by Anisef et al. as “an academic
research centre that differs from other more traditionally university-based centers both in its focus on policy and practice-relevant research and its collaborative partnership between the academic and community sectors” (2007, 9). Other Metropolis centers were also established in Montreal, the Prairies, Vancouver and Atlantic Canada. Shields and Evans note “an uneven and tiered set of partnering relationships” between collaborators in Metropolis initiatives, particularly as academics were perceived as providing more valuable research by government partners and treated preferentially to ISA participants (2012, 264). At the same time, they find it significant that “many of the academics see the community organizations, if not in complete equal research partnerships partnership positions, as very important and hence the community’s role in research is acknowledged and structurally recognized…” (Shields and Evans 2012, 264; also see Shields et al. 2015).

Ultimately, Metropolis as “an experiment in research collaboration” entailed a number of avenues for knowledge transfer including a variety of networking opportunities and the dissemination of research through working papers, books and other academic publications as well as numerous types of other knowledge transfer materials (Shields and Evans 2012, 264). While the effectiveness of knowledge transfer on actual policy decisions is difficult to measure, Shields and Evans conclude that “there are real opportunities in research partnerships that can be exploited to the benefit of all participants, and most importantly society as a whole” (2012, 268). Direct federal funding of the Metropolis Project was terminated in 2012 by the Harper Government. The regionally-based research centres ceased to exist except for the Toronto-based centre CERIS which was transformed with a very limited budget into knowledge exchange hub on migration and settlement (https://ceris.ca/). Significantly, it has been the community-based organizations associated with CERIS, who especially continue to value the work CERIS and the connections between community, academia and government that CERIS fosters, which has been the strongest forces working to maintain the centre’s existence.

Where the best and most accurate information can be harnessed by both community organizations and government policymakers through partnerships like Metropolis, diverse stakeholders can be better coordinated in fostering resilience for newcomers in Canada.

c. Employers and The Private Sector

As the government recedes from responsibilities in settlement service delivery, many authors identify a growing role in this sphere for employers and the private sector. Bauder and Flynn examine the scope of employer participation in the Provincial Nominee Program in demonstrating stake in Canadian immigration and settlement (2015). They exemplify the ways in which private sector companies directly nominate PNP candidates and organize formal settlement plans including rent subsidies, transportation, and meal plans (2015, 547). Elsewhere, common PNP employer practices include the facilitation of English classes, assistance with paperwork, orientation information, and referrals. Yet Bauder and Flynn find that “employers are
given a large amount of control over these services without proper evaluation or accountability” and “there is still much work to do” in ensuring that services are equitably distributed and of high quality (2015, 547). Shields et. al view these developments as part of a broader shift away from federal monopoly on immigrant selection and settlement governance, noting the importance of non-profit-private sector partnership as key stakeholders in newcomer labour market integration (2015, 22).

Examining multi-sectoral collaboration in Toronto, Good argues that “while participants may vary,” any coalition of stakeholders in newcomer settlement to be successfully “must include the business community” (2007, 10). She closely examines TRIEC as a “highly inter-sectoral” local initiative including assessment service providers, community organizations, employers, foundations, labour unions, occupational regulatory bodies, post-secondary institutions and all levels of government (Good 2007, 9). TRIEC has been widely praised by Good among others as an innovation in “creating policy capacity” in the arena of newcomer labour market integration (2007, 12). As Good notes, TRIEC’s influence is not limited to the City of Toronto but extends as a “polyscalar” initiative on multiple levels throughout the region and province (2007, 12). For example, Stasiulus et al. identify TRIEC as an influence for similar initiatives including the Niagara Immigrant Employment Council, the Waterloo Region Immigrant Council and Hire Immigrants Ottawa as major multi-sectoral initiatives incorporating employers and private businesses into Ontario’s settlement sector (2011, 114).

Projects undertaken through these coalitions include researching, mentoring, skill bridging, cultivating access to labour pools, awareness raising and training for employers. Ultimately, Stasiulus et al. note, such initiatives “address both sides of the potential employee-employer contract: skilled newcomers who would benefit from finding work in their field and employers in need of labour who require assistance in locating, hiring and integrating newcomers” (2011, 114). The central role of business communities in these initiatives marks their key role in fostering resilience for Canada’s newcomers, both as facilitators of labour market integration and in ensuring that access to employment is equitable and well-regulated.

13. Partnerships between the third sector and the Canadian government

   a. Innovations in multi-sectoral partnerships

Meinhardt et al. define partnership as “two or more organizations …working together toward a goal that will yield personal and third-party benefits” (2016, 283). In Canada, multiple stakeholders across the government and non-government sectors share a mandate to help immigrants and refugees effectively achieve social inclusion. For Meinhardt et al., despite “differences... with respect to how the integration goals should be accomplished,” third sector-government partnerships in Canada are strengthened through this common goal (2016, 290). New capacities and innovations in third sector-government alliances are demonstrated at a variety of levels. Shan, for example, is interested in grassroots practice by which newcomers themselves "participate in the
conceptualization, management and delivery of settlement services through inclusion on boards of governance and ISA activities” (2015, 23). The greater inclusion of newcomers in this sphere increases their visibility and voice in settlement policymaking. Partnership is also undertaken at the community level. In Quebec, Germain and Trinh note that since the late 1990s, community roundtables have been attended by multiple municipal networks, ISAs and community representatives “to improve the inclusion of immigrants through the mobilization of local stakeholders (2011, 193).

Given the concentration of policymaking power in upper-tier government, many argue that effective and equitable partnerships must also be realized at the federal and provincial levels (OCASI 2012; Pourier and Lucie 2010; Shields and Evans 2000; Richmond and Shields 2005). To some extent, progress has been noted at this level. Recognizing collaborative and multi-level initiatives across Ontario, Stasiulus et al. find that, as “inter-sectoral organizations, united by shared values and common interests, increasingly define and implement objectives in a given policy area,” we are entering a new “age of governance” in settlement (2011, 113). In particular, Stasiulus et al. note increasing space for the private and community sectors at the policymaking table (2011, 113). Many cite Local Immigration Partnerships (LIPs) as a key example of this inclusive spirit (Biles et al. 2011; Stasiulus et al. 2011; Tilson 2010; Siemiatycki & Triadafilopulos 2010).

LIPs were initiated in 2008. Federal and provincial consultation with umbrella ISA coalitions and the City of Toronto led to a call for proposals to heighten community collaboration in settlement (Neudorf 2016). Through funding streams established by COIA, the federal government agreed to establish and expand neighborhood settlement councils “as a means to systematize local engagement in settlement” and to “engage groups that will coordinate and enhance the current settlement and integration service delivery network, while avoiding duplication” (CIC 2013, 3). According to federal immigration authorities, the LIP membership includes “local civil society organizations, municipal representatives, provincial/territorial representatives, federal representatives, labour market actors, umbrella organizations, media, and local and regional research bodies” (CIC 2013, 11). These stakeholders “1) establish a partnership council, 2) create terms of reference for the partnership council, 3) conduct research and establish a local settlement strategy to be implemented over three years, 4) develop an annual action plan to address local priorities and 5) report on the implementation and execution of the action plan annually” (CIC 2013, 7). The first LIPs emerged in Toronto, creating multiple neighborhood-based LIPs and then consolidating into four quadrant committees headed by ISAs and one overarching committee led by the City. By 2011, increased federal funding helped LIPs grow and spread, establishing 45 councils across Ontario and nationwide across Alberta, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, British Columbia, Manitoba and Saskatchewan (Pero 2017, 75).

An independent assessment in 2010 by Bradford and Andrew found LIPs to be “an emerging Canadian example of … social innovation” (14). For them, LIPs facilitate the “application of new ideas to unmet social needs and generation of solutions through multi-sectoral partnerships that blend values, knowledge, and practices to produce high
performing hybrid organization or networks” (Bradford and Andrew 2010, 14). Similarly, for Biles et al., LIPs strengthen settlement outcomes through “the combination of local expertise and experimentation with provincial and national programs, the intersection of economic development and social inclusion measures, the investment in community and public policy leadership and the elevated profile that has been afforded to immigrant settlement and integration” (2011, 226). Tilson also identifies LIPs as a best practice in Canadian settlement, finding that they “have great potential to…bring together diverse parties who might not otherwise collaborate on immigrant settlement initiatives” (2010, 14). For others, the major contribution of the LIPs to Canadian settlement is broadened recognition and responsiveness to community and municipal concerns (Ashton et al. 2015; Siemiatycki and Triadafilopoulos 2010). Stasiulis et al. suggest that LIPs are emblematic of a shift from top-down “rule-based hierarchical bureaucratic silos” of government decision-making to “horizontal networks” of multi-sectoral governance (2011, 123). Where these grassroots initiatives enable ISAs to more effectively communicate their needs as well as the needs of their clients to policymakers in upper-tier government, resilience is fostered throughout the sector.

c. Barriers to multi-sectoral partnerships

Though efforts in partnership between settlement service non-profits and government stakeholders are widely praised, scholars of migration and community partners continue to call for greater coordination among these actors (Canadian Council for Refugees 2011; Kilbride and Anisef 2001: McGrath and McGrath 2013; Papillion 2002). Richmond and Shields find an “astounding lack of coordination and integration efforts” within the latter stages of settlement (2005, 516), and Biles et al. source the problem specifically to a “lack of robust, senior level infrastructure” in upper-tier governments (2011, 235). Shields and Evans note that, though non-profit-government service delivery partnership models are seemingly differentiated from “the rigidity, secrecy and controlling practices attributed to the traditional bureaucratic state,” effective top-down control is achieved through perpetual funding dependency and centralization of decision-making power (2000, 14). For this reason, they are critical of the capacity for meaningful multi-sectoral engagement in Canadian settlement, observing that “consultation with government results in only very limited possibilities to influence policy” (Evans and Shields 2014, 125; Evans and Shields 2018).

According to Meinhardt et al., “the strength of shared governance lies to the extent to which the state recognizes the autonomy of the voluntary sector without imposing its political will” (2016, 284). In their 2016 study, they found that non-profits and the Canadian government held very different perspectives on their shared partnership in settlement. Key government informants “stressed the importance of accountability… to protect the integrity of partnership agreements and maintain consistency and standardization over jurisdictions” (Meinhardt et al. 2016, 289). Overall, Meinhardt et al. suggest that the Canadian government “wants to do what is best for Canada, not only from the perspective of the immigrant but also from an economic and accountability perspective” (Meinhardt et al. 2016, 292). On the other hand, non-profit staff “stressed the importance of having enough time, enough personnel and financial
resources to ensure the long-term viability of the partnership, moving it beyond a talking state to a point at which action is being taken" (Meinhardt et al. 2016, 289). In their view, social inclusion as “an ongoing, long term, holistic process that leads to social well-being” is the priority in service provision (Meinhardt et al. 2016, 292). The disparity between these viewpoints is made particularly clear in critically examining the LIP partnership model. In 2010, Bradford and Andrew observed that LIPs were struggling to move from strategic planning into implementation phases of community projects (2010, 14), and by 2011 Stasiulus et al. noted that “there is real question regarding their durability once the federal funding that accompanied COIA dries up" (2011, 114). According to IRCC, federal funding “supports the LIP coordinator role only” and no funding is provided for project implementation (2016). While 79% of LIPs active in 2015 had completed a strategic plan, only 30% had completed the implementation phase of the project (IRCC 2016, 8). IRCC notes that funding uncertainties “jeopardize the implementation of long-term work” for LIPs, but also prioritizes limiting their financial risk in this venture (2016, 13).

While funding is a critical issue in multi-sectoral settlement partnerships, many argue that imbalances extend further beyond the “control of the purse strings” into the realm of policy and decision-making (Meinhardt et al. 2016, 292). In their 2016 study, Meinhardt et al. noted the perception among ISA staff that “centralized decision-making contributed to a lack of timely response to the changing needs of immigrants and the agencies serving them” (292). Ultimately, their “most pronounced finding” was doubt expressed by non-profit representatives as well as some informants in the Canadian government as to whether “contractual relationships… displaying such an asymmetrical distribution of power, can be called partnerships at all…” (Meinhardt et al. 2016, 291). Others apply similar frameworks in examining LIPs as emerging forms of multi-sectoral governance. Shan notes that the existence of these forums “should not be taken to mean that power is equally distributed among the stakeholders” (2015, 24), and McGrath and McGrath similarly question their efficacy “given the centralization of the provision of settlement services by the federal government” (2013, 7). In evaluating the shift from “government to governance," Stasiulus et al. agree that despite innovations in this sphere, policy and decision-making power has not yet diffused into local levels of settlement including municipalities, communities and ISAs (2011, 131). “If the shift to multi-scalar, multi-sectoral governance in immigrant matters... is to benefit more than a handful of newcomers” and to foster their resilience in the long term, they conclude that “the federal government will need to show greater responsiveness and democratic openness to more localized voices in settlement policies” (Stasiulus et al. 2011, 133). In examining government and non-profit sector relationships in Canada for evidence of a more balanced New Public Governance set of practices Evans and Shields conclude that NPM forms of relationships still remain dominant (2018).

14. International Perspectives

Though Canada’s settlement model is often referred to as “part of internationally recognized best practices” (Lowe et al. 2017, 38), given our increasing federal
commitment to immigration, Canadians are looking abroad to better understand the ways in which other governments equip immigrants and refugees to promote resilience to overcome social exclusion. Shields et al. suggest that Canada’s performance in settlement and social inclusion is more clearly “illuminated” through an international comparative lens, which highlights “not only policies and practices from elsewhere but also larger structural, political and other factors that more generally work to shape immigration and settlement policy” (2016, 3). While a comprehensive comparative analysis is beyond the scope of this review, major themes emerging from beyond Canada’s borders, add depth to our discussion of settlement, social inclusion, and newcomer resilience.

In 2010, Siemiatycki and Triadafilopoulos examined the United States, Australia, Germany and Britain in an effort to “learn from countries that, like Canada, have large immigrant populations and a federal system in which both national and sub-national governments have power over policy development and delivery” in terms of newcomer settlement (1). In particular, the authors examine the sub-national level of government, which has “taken on a more robust immigration role” in providing settlement services around the world (Siemiatycki and Triadafilopoulos 2010, 2). In their view, “a country’s approach to settlement services is not simply a technocratic, administrative or academic exercise” but “reflects the host society’s belief of the place of foreigners in their midst, and more broadly the role of government in civil society” (Siemiatycki and Triadafilopoulos 2010, 21). Overall, they find that Canadians view immigration and settlement more positively than in the four other case study countries, noting that the Canadian government “has been able to leverage this public support to put in place longer-standing and more comprehensive newcomer settlement programs” (Siemiatycki and Triadafilopoulos 2010, 21). They also find a consistent trend to devolution in settlement to sub-national jurisdictions in all five cases and that “Canada’s devolution to the provinces is therefore perfectly consistent with emerging international practice” (2010, 22). In each case, municipalities were found “increasingly …called upon to deliver and coordinate newcomer settlement initiatives” and offer locally responsive settlement services (Siemiatycki and Triadafilopoulos 2010, 22). However, Siemiatycki and Triadafilopoulos note that the underfunded “Building the New American Community” urban-level settlement pilot in the United States might serve as a lesson for Canada in that “devolving authority to sub-national governments without providing adequate federal funding is a recipe for inadequate service provision” (2010, 6). Despite decentralization of responsibilities in settlement, from the global experience of settlement and integration they conclude that “a tangible commitment from the national government is critical to achieving effective newcomer service systems” (Siemiatycki and Triadafilopoulos 2010, 22).

Valenzuela et al. consider fourteen OCED countries (Australia, New Zealand, the United States of America, Canada, the United Kingdom/England, Ireland, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, Italy, and Spain) to examine settlement and integration policies, and initiatives to identify cross-national settlement trends, and best practices. While the countries employ a range of settlement models, most emphasize labour market integration, education, language acquisition, and
services through government “partnership” models with the nonprofit sector (Valenzuela et al. 2018, 70). Other programs stood out as unique. For example, personalized settlement plans tailored to immigrant needs were identified in Germany, France, Netherlands, Sweden, Ireland, England and Australia. Special courses for women and children, a combination of settlement services with daycare services, were provided in France, Spain, the United States, New Zealand, Denmark, England, Canada, and Germany. Broader anti-discrimination policies and legal protection programs were noted as best practices in Sweden, the UK, Canada, and the United States. Additionally, Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, England, Australia and Canada offered introductory national orientation courses, though only Canada, New Zealand, and France did so before arrival (Valenzuela et al. 2018, 70). Lastly, Valenzuela et al. find “an emerging trend that stretches beyond the traditional horizons of settlement services” in the establishment of multi-ethnic sports teams as a means of integration and inclusion (2018, 70). In looking to foster the resilience of newcomers in Canada, policymakers should remain receptive to knowledge sharing in settlement service innovation from other immigrant-receiving countries.

Across literature pertaining to immigration and settlement, increasing attention is paid in particular to the European context. In 2005, Richmond and Shields were increasingly concerned regarding the demographic changes in aging workforces, as European countries began “looking more closely at the potential benefits of increased immigration” (2005, 521). While this remains true today, relevant are the flows of migrants and refugees across Western Europe which have heightened since 2014 and the rise of right-wing, nationalist governments fostering a “stronger anti-immigrant atmosphere” (Valenzuela et al. 2018, 67; Barrass and Shields 2017). Notably, while a range of literature exists on the European theatre of newcomer settlement, Garkish et al. find that little has been written on the role of European non-profit agencies (2017, 1851). In the context of increasing immigration in Western Europe, many suggest that Canada serve as a blueprint for international multiculturalism and settlement initiatives (Triadafilopoulos 2006; Richmond and Shields 2005). However, Richmond and Shields warn against exporting a “romantic and idealized model” to Europe without critically examining the context and consequences of neoliberal policy in Canadian settlement (2005, 522). Rather, they suggest that “dialogue with our European colleagues should focus...on the contradictions associated with state support of immigrant community associations,” remaining cognizant of the ways in which the policymaking affects vulnerability and resilience among newcomers, and the organizations that serve them (2005, 522).

15. Policy, Program and Governance Recommendations

Scholars and community organizers offer a range of policy, program and governance recommendations to better settlement outcomes and to foster resilience among immigrants and refugees in Canada. However, to realize long-term change, policymakers must also reconsider the structure and landscape of the non-profit and community-based sector. As Tilson notes, it is critical that stakeholders “focus first on
the settlement sector” as “an effective sector [which] lays the groundwork for program improvements” that are able to address the needs of immigrant populations (2010, 11). This report points to several recommendations ranging from policy and program shifts, to broader governance related structural change.

a. Settlement service eligibility

It is suggested that the Canadian government reconsider stringent eligibility requirements for federally funded settlement services. As Papillion notes, those who are disadvantaged by this policy, including refugee claimants, international students and temporary foreign workers are “mostly visible minorities and immigrants with limited social and human capital” and are already facing great burdens in settlement (2002, 17). Tilson (2010) also notes that immigrants and refugees who become Canadian citizens may still need further support in long-term settlement. Better funding and facilitating the social inclusion of these groups would greatly decrease their vulnerability. Nathalie suggests that “services should be equally available to all groups of newcomers independent of their entry status” (2018, 157). Shields et al. agree that this is a particularly important policy to reconsider, given Canada’s rising admission of temporary foreign workers, and the increasing asylum claimants seeking refuge in Canada (2014). For the Canadian government, widening federal funding to a much wider group of clientele has been not been deemed financially viable, but Tilson suggests that policymakers at least “permit greater flexibility in determining the length of time individuals are eligible for particular settlement services” (2010, 15). By allowing those in need to access these programs, the government could foster better settlement outcomes and greater resilience among those most affected by the challenges of establishing a life in Canada.

b. Targeted services for newcomers facing particular barriers to social inclusion

Newcomers to Canada are not a homogenous group, but experience multiple layers of exclusion and vulnerability. For this reason, experts in Canadian settlement resist a “one-size-fits-all” approach social inclusion (Tilson 2010; Germain and Trinh 2011; Nakhaie 2018). Nakhaie notes that service needs vary between newcomer classes and according to human and social capital. He focuses particularly on higher service needs among refugees, in terms of orientation to Canada, language and skills training, and social networks. Ultimately, Nakhaie suggests that “a more effective and customized means of delivering services that recognized immigrants’ entry status and diversity…their agency, and their service needs” would foster resilience among these populations, smoothing and shortening their resettlement process (2018, 157). Though he recognizes the federal Resettlement Assistance Program (RAP) as a key resource for GARs in Canada, Tilson too finds “a sound rationale for further federal government support to resettled refugees,” in terms of education, health and social services (2010, 15).

Targeted services are also recommended for demographic and intersecting subgroups within the broader newcomer population deemed at greater risk for social
exclusion (Türegün et al. 2018). Many scholars, concerned by the rate of social exclusion among racialized immigrants and refugees, state the need for collaborative strategy in addressing their needs directly (Papillion 2002; Richmond and Omidvar 2003; Zhu 2016; Shields et al. 2014; Galabuzi 2001). From a feminist perspective, Shan suggests that “researchers should not only explore the question of who receives settlement services but also reflect on the distribution of those services among privileged groups” and the distinct ways in which ISA underfunding harms racialized women in Canada (2015, 153). Other studies note the need for targeted services for youth (Shields and Lujan 2018; Kilbride and Anisef 2001; Richmond and Omidvar 2003), women (Bhuyan and Schmidt 2018), LGBTQIA+ immigrants (OCASI 2012; Cabral 2000), seniors (Mandell, Borras and Phonepraseuth 2018) and newcomers living with disabilities (OCASI 2012; Cabral 2000). Ultimately, resilience in long-term settlement cannot be realized without examining such issues through an intersectional lens. The first step is to ensure that settlement service providers are best acquainted with the needs of their clients, and communities are well equipped to address these complex issues.


c. Pre-arrival services

Some authors suggest that newcomer resilience might be best fostered before the settlement journey even begins, by offering a wider range of pre-arrival services. Shields et al., for example, find that pre-arrival settlement services not only orients and prepares newcomers for settlement in Canada, “but also connects them with services and supports upon arrival” (2014, 23). The IRCC have embraced pre-arrival services for prospective economic class immigrants and are funding nonprofit providers such as ACCES Employment in GTA which targets programing geared to occupations and areas of specialization such as engineering, entrepreneurship, finance, human resources (HR), information technology (IT), leadership, sales and marketing and supply chain (Shields 2018). The Canadian Council for Refugees notes that these services are particularly important for refugees coming to Canada, and emphasizes that they should be delivered in the refugee’s first language (2011, 16).

d. Third sector training in cultural sensitivity

With regard to third sector agencies, many authors underscore the importance of proper training in matters of cultural sensitivity. This recommendation is primarily geared towards multi-service agencies, with the resources to reach many different newcomer groups, but often lacking in linguistic and cultural compatibility. Nakhaie, for example, suggests that “special education programs are needed for case workers to ensure sensitivity to cultural differences, enhance cultural inclusiveness, and provide competency in understanding specific immigrant and refugee rights and needs” (2018, 157). Cabral similarly suggests that “all services should be both physically and culturally accessible,” particularly in sensitive areas such as healthcare, familial conflict and marital breakdown (2000, 24). For Agrawal et al., these issues must be “formally operationalized” on two levels; in diversity and training initiatives among frontline staff
The recommendation for greater cultural sensitivity also extends beyond non-profit service providers. Simich argues that cultural competency must also be considered in “mainstream contact points” such as schools, health centers, libraries and community centers,” and notes a need “to alter public discourse” in terms of anti-racism more broadly (2005, 265). These issues equally apply in the broader Canadian public sphere. Nakhaie stresses that if settlement and social inclusion are to be realized as a “two-way street,” it will depend on “the extent to which settlement agencies and the Canadian society at large support immigrants and refugees and meet their needs” (2018, 157). To this end, he suggests that the Canadian public “receive continual cultural and anti-discrimination education” through various mediums including the media, educational and religious institutions “with the goal of embracing diversity, minimizing systemic barriers that limit adaptation and fostering a more positive attitude about immigrants and refugees social, economic and cultural contributions to Canadian society” (2018, 157). In this manner, the Canadian public can bolster newcomer resilience both by dismantling discriminatory barriers on a daily basis, and by signalling the needs of immigrant and refugee communities to elected politicians.

e. Funding

While a complex variety of challenges face organizations serving immigrants and refugees in Canada, they share a common root. Mukhtar et al. note, “many of these problems are about funds” (2015, 389). Without fundamental changes in government funding, organizations are unable to offer a range of holistic, effective and appropriate services. Yet, funding increases can only foster resilience in the Canadian settlement sector, if enacted with other changes. As Richmond and Shields denote, “settlement agencies must turn their attention to the need for better funding rather than simply demanding more funding” (2005, 523). For them, this means “stable and long-term funding, full recovery of administrative and operational costs, reasonable and efficient systems of administrative accountability and a real community voice in the development of responsive and proactive settlement service programming” (Richmond and Shields 2005, 524). Lowe et al. add that “more flexibility and organizational discretion in spending” rather than rigid, contract-based funding, might shift accountability from government funders to newcomer communities themselves (2017, 39). Reducing the risk of financial dependency would also reduce the risk of funders imposing “advocacy chill” on non-profit service providers (Lowe et al. 2017, 39). Lowe et al. emphasize the continued importance of upper-tier government partnership with ISA coalitions, faith groups, community groups, and academic researchers at the local level to affirm “the value of resettlement and diversity in Canada, the presence of a settlement sector and the inadequacy of many social supports currently in place” (2017, 37). Mukhtar et al. conclude that “more stable, multi-year funding” would allow both for long-term planning of services, and broader development within the settlement sector (2015, 404). To some extent, this has been recognized and realized through the recent extension of multi-year contribution agreements under the Modernized Approach to Canada’s federal Settlement Program (Neudorf 2016). By continuing to improve stability in the settlement
sector “for both services and staff,” resilience is extended into newcomer communities, which are continually strengthened by effective institutions and services (Mukhtar et al. 2015, 404).

In terms of funding, many scholars and non-profit staff suggest that government resources be spread more evenly across the variety of organizations that serve newcomers in Canada. Lowe et al. recommend that the Canadian government support both large multi-service agencies as well as smaller ethno-specific agencies, recognizing that a diverse settlement sector “enables greater reach and a more flexible response to varying newcomer needs” (2017, 39). There are several visions of what this support might look like in practice. For Kilbride, the government could both support a diverse sector and strengthen partnerships within it by better equipping diverse agencies to help one another (2009). She suggests that larger agencies could be funded by the government to partner with smaller counterparts in accounting and grant-writing. On the other hand, smaller agencies could be funded to provide key cultural, translation, and interpretation services for multi-service partners (Kilbride 2009, ii). Contrarily, Sadiq suggests ethno-specific agencies need greater autonomy and independence in order to “devise, select and provide the services that will best serve their communities of interest” (2004, 30). Unanimously, authors agree on both the importance of ethno-specific organizations and the need for reconsideration of their funding, based on their ability to engage with newcomer communities.

Looking beyond the non-profit sector, several authors suggest that Canadian municipalities need more comprehensive funding in order to best equip their immigrant and refugee residents for the challenges of settlement. Kilbride and Anisef, for example, note that successful settlement in cities depends on Canada’s federal government providing for “strong, well-funded public housing, transit, cultural and recreational programs” (2001, 57). For this reason, Mwaringa argues that municipalities, and particularly large urban immigrant hubs, “should have a right to a diverse and larger share of tax dollars in order to fulfill their mandate to meet the needs of immigrant-driven population and economic growth” (2002, 6). At the same time, the needs of suburbs and smaller communities cannot be forgotten. Based on their findings in Ontario’s Peel region, Mukhtar et al. also emphasize the need for Canada’s federal government to reconsider funding both of ISAs and municipal agencies “outside of traditional metropolitan immigrant-receiving cities” (2015, 404). Ultimately, as they note, “it is imperative that municipalities and ISAs' needs be further integrated into settlement policy decisions to ensure the greatest outcomes for the newcomer populations they both serve” (Mukhtar et al. 2015, 405).

f. Vision of more productive non-profit-government relationships

As Mukhtar et al. note, “it is clear that the top-down approach to settlement policy, whereby funding and mandates are determined nationally, additional mandates and programs are developed provincially, and finally, programs are delivered at the municipal and non-profit level, is not always effective” (2015, 405). Through this process, energy, human capital, and resilience are sapped both from newcomer-serving
agencies and from their clients. Sadiq differentiates between “adaptive” and “transformative” responses to this troubling situation (2004, 25). The adaptive response takes for granted “a newcomer settlement system based on downsizing, efficiency modelled on the private sector, agency collaboration and purchase-of-service agreements” (2004, 25). In other words, given a neoliberal policy environment, agencies might be granted longer-term contracts, but remain fundamentally dependent on government funders, and must continue to compete for funding through “downsizing, diversification, re-location, co-location and partnering” despite detriment to service provision and client well-being (Sadiq 2004, 25).

If stakeholders in Canadian settlement can reconsider the structure of the sector, a “transformative” course of action emerges, which rejects New Public Management in the sector, and seeks alternatives (Sadiq 2004, 25). At the heart of the transformative response is “both the examination of the negative impacts of devolution and restructuring and a call for the restoration of government and community partnerships” (Sadiq 2004, 25). The transformative approach upturns the power relations between ISAs, the Canadian government and newcomer communities, stressing “accountability to communities, not to funders” (Sadiq 2004, 26). Rather than top-down policymaking, these policies emphasize “newcomer civic engagement and community development, advocacy and political mobilization, evaluation of settlement goals and solidarity with broader movements for social change” (Sadiq 2004, 26). Elsewhere, Shields et al. refer to this stream of public policy as New Public Governance (NPG), which “moves away from narrow contract culture… and rigid funding and accountability models” that characterize New Public Management (2016, 16). Instead, NPG shifts towards “horizontal accountability and co-governance” through collaborative and equitable partnerships between government and non-government stakeholders in settlement (Shields et al. 2014, 20). Furthermore, NPG invites grassroots innovation, non-profit autonomy, and greater political advocacy for newcomers in Canada. If resources and decision-making power are more evenly distributed, Shields and Evans note that true partnerships are possible through which “policy can be developed, shaped and influenced though a process of multi-actor input and social learning” (2000, 18).

Though NPG is a departure from the neoliberal status quo in Canadian policy, there are already developments pointing to its uptake at the grassroots level. Neudorf identifies Local Immigration Partnerships (LIPs) and umbrella organizations as examples of “horizontal coordination,” between local stakeholders and upper-tier government policymakers (2016, 95). Others find that LIPs are a “powerful tool” (Biles et al. 2011, 226) with “great potential” (Tilson 2010, 13) to unite stakeholders in settlement on equal ground. For this reason, the Canadian government should move to expand LIPs not only in initial funding, but also in project implementation. Collaboration and cooperation is also visible at the municipal level. In five major cities and regions across Ontario, Stasiulus et al. recognize “some type of collaborative- and sometimes multi-level- initiative… underway in which the municipal or sometimes other stakeholders were working in a coordinated fashion to address service gaps…” for newcomer residents such as LIPs and employment councils (2011, 112). These initiatives have been activated by municipalities developing into key immigrant service providers. If the
diverse Canadian settlement sector continues to innovate and strengthen in this way, newcomers will be made more resilient as a result. Today, multi-sectoral partnerships in settlement are still an issue. Neudorf notes, “vestiges of a more top-down approach to coordination remain” (2016, 102). Nonetheless, in fostering resilience among ISAs and their newcomer clients, local level developments should encourage those with policymaking power in Canada to not only consider changing current policies, but also to invite new perspectives by including newcomer and non-profit voices in the conversation.

16. Conclusion: Resilience and Settlement in Canada

In 2016, the fourteen business and academic leaders that comprise Canada’s Advisory Council on Economic Growth recommended that permanent immigration be increased to 450,000 admissions per year over the next five years, far surpassing the commitments of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s 2018-2020 Immigration Levels Plan. In addition to sustaining Canada’s aging workforce, they note that immigration and settlement “has positive implications for business and job creation for Canadians through entrepreneurship and innovation, international trade and, if done right, can raise living standards for all Canadians” (Advisory Council on Economic Growth 2016, 4). In Canada, pro-immigration attitudes are not only held in the upper echelons of the private sector. Richmond and Shields note that “public discourse continues to focus mainly on the benefits of immigration and the rights of newcomers” as opposed to the security and terrorism dominated dialogues in the United States and “fortress Europe” (2005, 514), although during the Harper years there was a measure of retreat from this Canadian norm (Barrass and Shields 2017). The considerable human capital and cultural vibrancy brought to Canada by immigrants and refugees is well-recognized. However, the settlement process for all newcomers is long and challenging, and these groups become vulnerable to social exclusion at particular intersections of gender, socio-economic status, age, legal status, ability and ethnicity. Despite all they bring to this country, social exclusion has been significant among racialized immigrants and refugees in Canada.

If newcomers are to overcome social exclusion and become meaningfully socially included, they must be equipped to use their considerable human capital to absorb the inevitable shocks of the settlement process. Contrary to the neoliberal logic of self-reliance, this cannot occur without the support of Canadian institutions (Root et al. 2014; Root et al. forthcoming). Our social, political and economic environment can either help or hinder their efforts. If settlement in Canada is truly a “two-way street” where both government and non-government stakeholders help to facilitate social inclusion in fostering newcomer resilience (IRCC 2016), then state investments in settlement support and progressive migrant legislation and programming must continue. However, Simich et al. note, “just as immigrants face many systemic challenges during settlement and integration, so do service providers and policymakers” (2005, 265). Where these critical support lines are weakened and made less resilient, vulnerability is passed directly into newcomer communities. This report has outlined the neoliberal context of
settlement in Canada, mapping the vast landscapes, and hierarchies of government and non-government roles within this ecosystem. It has focussed on the way that these diverse actors shape immigration and settlement in Canada, particularly at the local level of communities, non-profit agencies, and municipalities. In analyzing both agreements and divergences in a canon of academic, government, and grey literature from the past 20 years, the adverse effects of neoliberal policy and New Public Management governance in this sphere has been made clear. Despite centralizing policymaking power in upper-tier governments, research points to interesting developments of a shift “from government to governance,” and new appreciation of local innovation in settlement (Stasiulus et al. 2011, 112). Like a rising tide that lifts all boats, immigrants and refugee resilience is enhanced as settlement agencies, immigrant communities and municipalities gain strength and capacity. As part of the Building Migrant Resilience in Cities project, a multi-sectoral initiative among academics, government representatives, practitioners, policymakers, and newcomer communities, this report aims to contribute to this collaborative effort.


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